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INTRODUCTION

In a criminal case, should the defendant have the right to confront, face-to-face, the witnesses who appear at trial and testify
against the defendant?' In analyzing this issue, the courts have re-

peatedly recognized that there are costs and benefits associated with a
right to face-to-face confrontation.2 The principal cost is the potential

1. Although the right to face-to-face confrontation and the right to cross-examination
will be one and the same for most purposes, see Ohio v. Rolerts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64
(1980), the right to face-to-face confrontation as an independent right is the focus of this
Article.
2. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014, 1020-21 (1988) (reversing the Iowa Supreme Court's decision, which allowed the use of a screen between the defendant and a child
witness, and thereby disallowing the State's assertion that the appellant's right to confrontation
was outweighed by the State's interest in protecting the sexual abuse victim); Roberts, 448
U.S. at 64 (recognizing that "competing interests if 'closely examined'

. . .

may warrant

dispensing with confrontation at trial") (emphasis added) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284. 295 (1973)): State v. Dolen, 390 So. 2d 407, 409-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (remanding a case so that its outcome may properly be based upon "whether the potential detrimental effect upon the witness outweighs the interest or benefit to the defendant");
see also The Supreme Court, 1987 Termn-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 157 n.46

(1988) ("The [Supreme] Court has balanced costs and benefits in several confrontation clause
cases.").
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anxiety, in some cases even trauma, which the witness may experience from having to confront the defendant face-to-face The principal benefit is the reduced risk of an erroneous conviction In comparing the costs and benefits, the courts traditionally and generally

have held that the benefits of face-to-face confrontation (the savings
from the reduced risk of an erroneous judgment) outweigh the costs
(the potential anxiety, and even trauma, to the witness)--until Mary-

3. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020 ("[F]ace-to-face [confrontation] may, unfortunately, upset
the truthful rape victim."); State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d 150, 162 (Ariz. 1989) ("To whatever
extent the law insists on face-to-face confrontation, it heightens the anxiety, and perhaps the
trauma, of those who are willing to bear witness against crime."); see also Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMi L. REV. 19, 83 (1985) ("Witnesses who testify in open
court often suffer some emotional distress. Many, if not most, rape victims suffer severe
emotional distress or trauma while testifying, especially when face to face with the accused.
Presumably, so do many other groups of victims.").
4. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20 (comparing the right to face-to-face confrontation with
the right to cross-examine the witness and finding that both serve much the same purpose in
that both ensure the integrity of the factfinding process. "[F]ace-to-face presence . . . may
confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.");
United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Elaboration and application
of the rules of evidence and the Confrontation guarantee are themselves directed to a fully
pragmatic concern; they are designed to provide some reasonable assurance that defendants
found guilty are guilty."); Vincent, 768 P.2d at 162 ('To whatever extent the law cushions a
witness against the crucible of confrontation, it diminishes a fundamental courtroom test of
truth."); Herbert v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 855 (Ct. App. 1981) ("A witness's
reluctance to face the accused may be the product of fabrication rather than fear or embarrassment."); see also Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019 ("It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a
person 'to his face' than 'behind his back."'); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 n.6 (reiterating the
difficulty of lying when in the presence of an innocent defendant).
5. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-22 (holding that the defendant's confrontation right was
violated when the lower court allowed a child witness to testify from behind a screen); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-26 (1968) (refusing to affirm the lower court's decision due
to the prosecution's failure to produce a witness residing in a federal prison); United States
v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (ruling that a procedure which allowed a
kidnapping victim to testify via pretrial deposition under circumstances that allowed the defendant to be present at the deposition, but outside of the victim's view, was violative of the
defendant's confrontation right); Britton v. Maryland, 298 F. Supp. 641, 647 (D. Md. 1969)
(holding that the State did not make a good faith effort to produce the witness, who was in
the armed services, and therefore use of the deposition was not allowed); Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 & n.2 (Ct. App. 1984) (overruling the trial court's decision to allow children to testify via video, and explaining that physical confrontation falls
within the scope of the Sixth Amendment and "[t]he closed-circuit television order ...
raise[d] significant and complex federal and state constitutional issues, potentially affecting
petitioner's, fundamental rights to a public trial, confrontation of witnesses against him and
due process") (footnote omitted); Herbert, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 853 (agreeing with the defendant
that a seating arrangement violated his right to confront accusatory witnesses and stating that
hearsay rules indicate that "a personal view of the witness by the defendant at some point is
part of the right of confrontation"); Keshishian v. State, 386 A.2d 666, 667 (Del. 1978) (de-
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land v. Craig.'
In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court implicitly ruled that in
child sexual abuse cases, the costs of face-to-face confrontation may
exceed the benefits. 7 The Court held that where the trial court makes

an individualized finding that the child abuse victim would experience
undue emotional distress if compelled to testify face-to-face against
the defendant, and the reliability of the evidence is otherwise ensured,' the defendant is not entitled to the right to face-to-face confrontation. 9 The Court's holding appears to conflict with the traditional analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation"0 and raises a

host of questions concerning the legitimacy and scope of the Court's
opinion." Although these questions can be, and have been, analyzed
ciding that the lower court incorrectly accepted a psychologist's opinion regarding the
witness's instability as the basis for excusing the witness from live testimony); State v.
Brookins, 478 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Mo. 1972) (disallowing use of a deposition when it was
apparent that the prosecution had made no effort to bring the witness to the court); Sheehan
v. State, 223 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Wis. 1974) (finding that a witness's fear of questions pertaining to his homosexuality was an insufficient reason to deny the defendant his right to
face-to-face confrontation); see also State v. Gilbert, 326 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Wis. 1982) ("In
cases in which adult witnesses have asked to be excused from their duty to testify...
courts have generally been reluctant to excuse the witness, concluding that the public policy
in favor of compelling testimony outweighs the possible harm that testifying would cause.").
In addition to the above authority, there is very compelling Supreme Court dicta
which supports the belief that the Confrontation Clause does indeed require a literal interpretation of face-to-face confrontation. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 n.6 ("The requirement of
personal presence . . . undoubtedly makes it more difficult to lie against someone, particularly if that person is an accused and present at trial.") (quoting 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WE1NSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
800[011 (1991)); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 156 (1970) (affording "the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a
face-to-face encounter in front of the trier of fact"); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55
(1899) (noting that a fact that can only be proved against the defendant by witnesses must
be proved "by witnesses who confront him at trial, upon whom he can look while being
tried"); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (noting that the defendant's Constitutional protection is preserved by "the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness
face to face").
6. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
7. Id. at 853.
8. Id. at 857. The reliability of evidence can otherwise be ensured when, e.g., a oneway closed circuit television procedure is used, thereby ensuring the other elements of confrontation: "physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the
trier of fact." Id. at 846.
9. Id. at 857.
10. See cases cited supra note 5.
11. The following questions are raised by this holding: Does the Court's opinion create
a broad new exception to the Confrontation Clause any time the witness is present at trial
but "psychologically unavailable" to testify face-to-face against the defendant, regardless of the
age of the victim, the nature of the crime, or the manner in which the state interest is asserted? Does the state's interest in protecting children from the trauma associated with face-
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to-face confrontation apply only to child abuse cases, or does the state's interest extend to
other cases involving children who are the victims of other crimes? (Suppose a child victim
was testifying against a parent in an attempted murder case. Assuming the experience of testifying face-to-face against the parent would inflict extraordinary trauma upon the victim,
could the child testify via a one-way closed circuit television monitor?)
Does the state's interest in protecting witnesses from the trauma associated with faceto-face confrontation apply only to children? (Consider a child sexual abuse, case, but by the
time the case was tried the victim was an adult. Further, consider a sexual assault case in
which the victim was an adult, but the victim suffered from a mental condition which rendered their psychological age that of a minor. Suppose the case was a rape or attempted
murder case, and the victim was an adult, but the victim could establish that having to testify face-to-face in front of the defendant would result in extraordinary trauma. Imagine a
spousal abuse case in which the victim would experience undue emotional distress if required
to testify face-to-face against the defendant.)
Assuming that the reliability of the evidence is otherwise assured, which state interests
will justify denying the accused the right to confront face-to-face those testifying against him
or her? Does the state's interest have to be identified by the state legislature, or may a court,
in any given case, consider the issue if properly raised by the prosecution? (Suppose there
was no statute in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856 (1990), but the prosecution petitioned the court to permit the procedure.) Assuming, arguendo, an important state interest
which may outweigh the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation, what is the "minimum
showing of emotional trauma required," 497 U.S. at 856, before the accused loses the right
to face-to-face confrontation? In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court expressly left this
issue for another day. "We need not decide the minimum showing of emotional trauma required for use of the special procedure, however, because the Maryland statute, which requires a determination that the child witness will suffer 'serious emotional distress such that
the child cannot reasonably communicate,' . .. clearly suffices to meet constitutional standards." (citation omitted). Id. at 856. The Court implied, however, that the threshold need not
be very high. See id. at 856-57. When discussing what the state must show to use the special procedure, the Court stated that "the trial court must find that the emotional distress
suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e.,
more than 'mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify."' Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)). For a discussion of
other cases in which special procedures could be applied, see Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity
Value of Face-To-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 916 (1988):
If "confrontation" is redefined in child abuse cases, then it may be redefined in
other categories of cases as well, depending on a judge's or legislature's inclination
to weigh the victim's trauma in those cases more heavily than the trauma of victims in other cases. One-way mirrors may appear not only in child abuse cases,
but also in adult rape cases, attempted murder cases, kidnapping cases, and any
other cases in which the victim has suffered physical and psychological trauma that
may be aggravated by facing the defendant.
Id.
The belief expounded above has been applied especially, but not exclusively, in the
area of murder cases. See Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 211-13 (6th Cir. 1993) (overturning the lower court's decision in a burglary case in which the lower court found that a
doctor's testimony as to the witnesses's precarious health conditions was sufficient proof to
establish the need for a deposition rather than live testimony); Department of Social Serv. v.
Armandos, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4049 407 (Ct. App. 1993) (allowing the use of close-circuit
television in a dependency proceeding despite the lack of any Craig-like statutory authorization and explaining its decision as being well within the "inherent powers" of the court to
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from a number of different perspectives,12 conspicuous by its absence

carry out its duties); Hernandez v. State, 597 So. 2d 408, 409-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming the holding below and ruling that a lack of statutory protection for child witnesses
of murder did not matter because "[t]he state has an interest in protecting child victims . . .
from the additional trauma of testifying in open court, in defendant's presence")- State v.
Nutter, 609 A.2d 65, 74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (overturning the finding below that
New Jersey's Craig-like statute could also protect a child who had witnessed a murder); State
v. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d 390 (S.C. 1991) (finding no fault with the lower court's decision to
place a mother at the far end of the defense table out of sight of her children who were
testifying against her in a trial for the murder of her stepson); Gonzales v. State, 818 S.W.2d
756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (implying that children who witness their mothers
being murdered fall within the class of victims that the Craig-like statute seeks to protect);
see also Government of Virgin Islands v. Riley, 750 F. Supp. 727, 728-29 (D.V.I. 1990)
(considering whether to apply Craig to a murder case, the court did "not believe Craig
should be read so narrowly as to apply only in child sexual abuse cases," but declined to
make such a decision absent a Craig-like statute in force in the jurisdiction). But see Ford v.
State, 592 So. 2d 271, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("This case does not involve child
abuse or sexual abuse upon a child. This is a homicide case . .. . The legislature restricted
the procedures . . . to child abuse/sexual abuse victims or witnesses.").
Even when Craig is employed in the realm for which it was intended, it has still led
to confusing decisions. See Larson v. Dorsey, No. 91-2198, 1993 WL 76278, at *2 (10th Cir.
1993) (leaving unanswered the question of whether there should be a new determination of
the child's possible trauma when there is a substantial time space between the original ruling
on the issue and the actual date of the trial); United States v. Bateman, 805 F. Supp. 1058,
1060 (D.N.H. 1992) (implying that once a child reaches his or her majority, the protection of
Craig may no longer be relied upon to avoid face-to-face confrontation); State v. Schaffer,
No. 90-0716-CR, 1991 WL 121021, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 2, 1991) (allowing videotaped
depositions despite the child witness's ability to freely testify in the defendant's presence
during the preliminary hearing). The ruling in Bateman is especially troubling in light of the
fact that a minor's trauma will not simply disappear due to the passing of an arbitrary birth
date.
12. See Josephine A. Bulkley, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Ease Child Abuse Prosecutions: Use of Closed-Circuit Television and Children's Statements of Abuse Under the Confrontation Clause, 16 NOVA L. REv. 687 (1992) (explaining that recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the Court's preference for the prosecution's position in criminal cases);
John B. Mitchell, What Would Happen if Videotaped Depositions of Sexually Abused Children
Were Routinely Admitted in Civil Trials? A Journey Through the Legal Process and Beyond,
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 261 (1992) (showing how collateral estoppel principles will not
shield a child victim from testifying at trial); Nancy Schleifer, Might Versus Fright: The
Confrontation Clause and the Search for "Truth" in the Child Abuse Family Court Case, 16
NOVA L. REV. 783 (1992) (propounding that in child abuse cases the Confrontation Clause
actually prevents the trier of fact from hearing the truth); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of
Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1323, 1370-80 (1991) (examining the Supreme Court's response to issues involving
admissibility of hearsay in child sexual abuse cases); Kathleen A. Barry, Comment, Witness
Shield Laws and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Presumption of Guilt, 15 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 99 (1990) (claiming that defendants cannot overcome the presumption of guilt brought
about due to attempts to protect the child victim); Gall D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Note, Children
as Witnesses after Maryland v. Craig, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993 (1992) (arguing that both the
standard of proof and the threshold of actual harm to the child victim must be set high
before the court opts for any alternative to the defendant's constitutional right of confronta-
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is a law and economics analysis. 3
Under a law and economics analysis, the function of procedural

rules is to minimize the costs associated with the risk of an erroneous
judgment ("the expected cost of error") at a cost which produces a
net benefit to society. 14 The expected cost of error ("CE") is (1) the
tion); Theresa Cusick, Note, Televised Justice: Toward a New Definition of Confrontation
under Maryland v. Craig, 40 CAm. U. L. REv. 967, 972 (1991) (describing Craig as a
"creature of public policy" which overreaches its limited purpose of protection and leaves
unanswered the characteristics of the class to be protected); Susan H. Evans, Note, Criminal
Procedure-Closed Circuit Television in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Keeping the Balance
Between Realism and Idealism-Maryland v. Craig, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 471, 472
(1991) (exploring "how closed circuit television fulfills the traditional purposes of the confrontation clause and advances two state interests: protecting children from additional trauma
and bringing sexual offenders to justice"); Katherine A. Francis, Note, To Hide in Plain
Sight: Child Abuse, Closed Circuit Television, and the Confrontation Clause, 60 U. CIN. L.
REv. 827, 830 (1992) (stating that "Craig did not violate the Confrontation Clause because
child abuse prosecutions call for respect of the witness's emotional well-being as well as the
accused's constitutional rights"); Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Traumatized Witnesses: Defining "Confrontation" to Protect Both Children and
Defendants, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 185 (1991) (questioning whether (1) Craig really
proves that closed-circuit television advances the protection of children, and (2) whether the
defendant's rights are only narrowly infringed upon by the procedure).
13. A traditional law and economics analysis examines the connection between the costs
and benefits of a given scenario. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS 7 (1983) (describing efficiency in law and economics as "the relationship
between the aggregate benefits . . . and the aggregate costs of the situation"); see also
WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 1 (2d ed. 1988);
LLAD PHILLIPS & HAROLD L. VOTEY, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME CONTROL 19 (1981).
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-16 (4th ed. 1992) (describing the interrelationships between value, utility, efficiency, and cost/benefit).
The absence of any type of law and economics examination of the issues in Craig is
particularly conspicuous given: (1) the Court's cost-benefit analysis of the case, see Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 (1990) (implying that societal wealth would be increased if the
well-being of the child abuse victim is recognized over the defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation); and (2) the Court's historical application of a cost-benefit analysis to the issue
of the right to face-to-face confrontation. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. The
Court's cost-benefit analysis is consistent with, and implicitly embraces, a law and economics
analysis of the issue.
14. Substantive rules of law, and criminal laws in particular, increase social wealth by
discouraging people from engaging in socially harmful conduct and punishing those who engage in such conduct. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 223. Inasmuch as the criminal justice
system is not perfect, however, the punishment has to be discounted by the probability that
an erroneous judgment may occur. Cf. id. at 224-25 (discussing the implications of legal
error). The discounted net punishment means that some people will go ahead and engage in
the prohibited conduct even though it will result in a net social loss. Cf. id. at 223-25. Accordingly, the risk of an erroneous judgment produces a cost of error which reduces social
wealth. See id. at 553. Society desires to minimize the cost of error, but only if doing so is
efficient. Cf. id. at 23 (discussing the positive role of economic analysis of the law). The
principal mechanism society uses to reduce the risk of an erroneous judgment, and hence the
cost of error, is procedural rules. Id. at 549.
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probability of an erroneous conviction ("P of EC") times the expected
cost of an erroneous conviction ("C of EC"); plus (2) the probability
of an erroneous acquittal ("P of EA") times the expected cost of an
erroneous acquittal ("C of EA"):
CE = [(P of EC) x (C of EC)] + [(P of EA) x (C of EA)].
A procedural rule produces a net benefit to society if the net reduction in the expected cost of error exceeds the expected direct cost of
the rule.
The traditional and general rule that the defendant is entitled to
the right to face-to-face confrontation is consistent with a law and
economics analysis. Face-to-face confrontation significantly reduces
the expected cost of error by significantly reducing the probability of
an erroneous conviction. There is, however, a cost associated with
face-to-face confrontation: the potential emotional distress that a witness may experience. The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme
Court opinions prior to Maryland v. Craig support the qualitative
conclusion that the magnitude of the economic benefit of face-to-face
confrontation (from the reduced expected costs of an erroneous judgment) exceeds the expected direct cost (in terms of the potential
emotional distress to the witness). 5
Although the Supreme Court's holding in Maryland v. Craig
conflicts with the general rule and traditional economic analysis of
face-to-face confrontation, at first blush the Court's opinion appears
defensible because of the differences between the traditional analysis
and the Court's analysis.'6 The Court minimized the benefits of faceto-face confrontation by (1) characterizing face-to-face confrontation
as simply one of many elements of the Confrontation Clause, and (2)
analogizing the Maryland procedure to the hearsay exceptions and
claiming that the evidence admitted under the Maryland procedure is
just as reliable as the evidence admitted under the hearsay exceptions. 7 On the other hand, the Court emphasized the costs associated
with face-to-face confrontation and reasoned that the individualized
finding that the witness would experience trauma if required to testify
face-to-face against the defendant means that there are exceptionally

15. See supra note 5. Since absolute values cannot be assigned to either the cost or the
benefit figure, however, the analysis of the issue is as much qualitative as quantitative.
16. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-54.
17. Id.
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high costs associated with face-to-face confrontation in such cases"8
(a much higher cost than the expected cost to the witness used in the

traditional analysis of face-to-face confrontation). Accordingly, in line
with the hearsay exceptions, the Court concluded that due to the high

costs of face-to-face confrontation in child abuse cases, the Maryland
procedure adequately ensured the reliability of the evidence in such
cases at a cheaper cost (thereby producing a net benefit to society). 9

There are problems, however, with each step of the Court's
analysis.2" First, the Court underestimated the benefit of face-to-face

confrontation, one of the principal mechanisms for minimizing the
risk of an erroneous conviction. Second, the evidence admitted under
the Maryland procedure is not as reliable as the evidence admitted

under the hearsay exceptions. Evidence is admitted under the hearsay
exceptions only because of its inherent indicia of reliability, which
also permits the jury to properly assess its credibility. In contrast, the
child abuse testimony admitted under the Maryland procedure lacks

any indicia of reliability, and the appearance of confrontation without
face-to-face confrontation only heightens the risk that the jury will
over assess the credibility of the evidence (thereby increasing the
probability of "an erroneous conviction). Third, the Court overestimated the costs of face-to-face confrontation (and thus the benefits of the

Maryland procedure). Before the direct cost (the potential trauma) will
exceed the benefit of face-to-face confrontation, the direct cost will

exceed the costs associated with an increase in the probability of an
erroneous acquittal if the witness was not called to testify. Accord-

18. Id. at 855-56.
19. Id. at 851, 857.
20. The Court exacerbates this problem by declining to define the exact level of trauma
required to allow the witness to invoke the protective procedure. See id. at 856. Instead, the
Court rules generally that "a State's interest in the . . . well-being of child abuse victims
may be sufficiently important to outweigh . . . a defendant's right to face his or her accusers
in court," id. at 853, and more specifically that the Maryland statute meets constitutional
standards. Id. at 856. Unfortunately, a quick glance at various statutes offering the same or
similar types of protection to child abuse witnesses in other states reveals an alarming disparity in the level and description of the trauma required to invoke the procedure. See infra
notes 265-66. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, levels more basic criticisms to the Court's ability
to judge the necessary degree of trauma. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 869-70 (Scalia, J.,dissenting). He points out that this ruling allows a child witness to escape face-to-face confrontation
merely because of an unwillingness to face the defendant, and that "unwillingness cannot be
a valid excuse under the Confrontation Clause, whose very object is to place the witness
under the sometimes hostile glare of the defendant." Id. at 866. Furthermore, Justice Scalia
expresses incredulity at the basic premise of any statute which would allow the prosecution
to call any witness "who cannot reasonably communicate." Id. at 867.
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ingly, in any given case it is more efficient not to call a witness who
would suffer trauma from face-to-face confrontation than to call the
witness and not require face-to-face confrontation. 2 Moreover, whatever benefits may exist from eliminating the trauma associated with
face-to-face confrontation have to be reduced by the direct costs
inherent in the Maryland procedure. The Court failed to include in its
cost-benefit analysis the administrative costs of the Maryland procedure, which are much higher than the administrative costs of the
hearsay exceptions.
The problem with the Supreme Court's opinion in Maryland v.
Craig is that the Court missed the forest for the trees. Because the
cost of an erroneous conviction is so high, any increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction will significantly increase the expected cost of error, which will exceed the benefits associated with eliminating face-to-face confrontation in any given case. For the benefits
from eliminating face-to-face confrontation to overcome this increased
cost, there will have to be a disproportionately high number of cases
in which obtaining direct evidence in compliance with face-to-face
confrontation is either prohibitively expensive or simply impossible.
Just as the hearsay exceptions to the right to face-to-face confrontation can be justified from a macro perspective, so too can the Maryland procedure. The problem underlying Maryland v. Craig was not
the emotional trauma that a child abuse victim may experience from
face-to-face confrontation, but rather the frequency with which such
trauma may occur. Because of the potential trauma inherent in obtaining the evidence in child abuse cases, in a disproportionately high
number of cases the cost of obtaining the evidence becomes prohibitively expensive or simply impossible to obtain. The practical effect
of the high costs is that a disproportionately high number of witnesses fail to participate in the prosecution process. Each witness who
fails to participate increases the probability of an erroneous acquittal,
which in turn decreases the effective enforcement of child sexual
abuse laws.' The effective enforcement of a criminal law requires
that the net punishment for the offense is high enough that a sufficient number of individuals are deterred from engaging in the
criminalized conduct.' 3 If a state is not achieving the effective en-

21.
22.
increases
23.

POSNER, supra note 13, at 553.
Each erroneous acquittal decreases the net punishment for the offense, which in turn
the probability that more individuals will commit the offense.
See POSNER, supra note 13, at 223-28; Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
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forcement of a criminal statute, the most efficient response is first, to
increase the penalty associated with the conduct,24 and if that does
not achieve the desired level of net punishment, then to take steps to

increase the probability that individuals violating the law will be
apprehended and convicted.' Having exhausted the more efficient
methods of attempting to achieve the effective enforcement of child

abuse statutes, the states modified the traditional right to face-to-face
confrontation in an effort to increase the apprehension and conviction
rate. 6 The states determined that the net social loss from the unacceptably high level of child abuse exceeded the increased costs produced by modifying the right to face-to-face confrontation.
The macro view of the problem underlying Maryland v. Craig

puts the Court's holding and its opinion into perspective. The Court's
opinion as written focuses too much on the micro level, individualized finding of high costs to the witness if face-to-face confrontation

were required. The result is a conclusory opinion which flies in the
face of both the spirit and the letter of the Confrontation Clause,
lacks a persuasive rationale for why the right to face-to-face confrontation is not a part of the constitutional Confrontation Clause, and
provides no guidance as to the scope of the opinion or the right to
face-to-face confrontation. The Court's focus on the micro level, individualized finding of trauma arguably constitutes a broad attack on
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176, 179-180, 191 n.35, 192 (1968); Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy,
1990 DuKE L.J. 1, 10 (1990); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (1985).
24. See Becker, supra note 23, at 177-78; see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 12
(describing the common response of more severe incarceration for repeat as opposed to firsttime offenders). See generally POSNER, supra note 13, at 223-31 (acknowledging society's
heavy reliance upon imprisonment, but then offering the possible alternative of a far-reaching
fine system).
25. See Posner, supra note 23, at 1204, 1206; see also Becker, supra note 23, at 17678; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10 n.48.
26. In Maryland v. Craig, the Maryland procedure was interpreted as intending to "both
protect the child and enhance the public interest by encouraging effective prosecution of the
alleged abuser." 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 285
(Md. 1987)). The traditional analysis of face-to-face confrontation focuses on the expected
costs and benefits of face-to-face confrontation at trial. The traditional analysis assumes that
enough complainants are coming forward and pressing charges for the state to achieve effec'tive enforcement of its criminal laws, and thus the analysis focuses on whether face-to-face
confrontation minimizes the cost of error under this assumption. The problem, however, is
that for the crime of child abuse, not enough complainants were coming forward and pressing
charges for the state to achieve the net punishment level necessary to enforce. its child abuse
laws effectively. Not enough complainants were coming forward and effectively participating
in the prosecution process because of the trauma inherent in face-to-face confrontation.
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the right to face-to-face confrontation, subjecting the right to a case
by case analysis. Based on the Court's micro level analysis, the
Maryland procedure arguably should be employed in any case where
there is an individualized finding that the witness would experience
undue emotional distress from face-to-face confrontation, regardless of
the age of the victim and/or the nature of the offense.' Such a
broad attack on the right to face-to-face confrontation is indefensible
both quantitatively and qualitatively.
If, however, the Court's holding is viewed in light of the macro
level problem underlying Maryland v. Craig, it constitutes a relatively
narrow exception to the Confrontation Clause. The general rule that
the defendant is entitled to face-to-face confrontation remains intact
unless the state establishes: (1) that the state is not able to achieve
the effective enforcement of the criminal statute in question; (2) that
the reason the state cannot achieve effective enforcement of the statute in question is because not enough witnesses are coming forward
and participating in the prosecution process; and (3) that the reason
not enough witnesses are participating in the prosecution process is
because of the costs inherent in face-to-face confrontation. Then, and
only then, should the state conduct an individualized hearing to determine if the witness would be unable to participate in the prosecution
process unless face-to-face confrontation were eliminated. The macro
level analysis of the Court's holding in Maryland v. Craig is consistent with both a normative and a positive economic analysis of the
issue underlying the case.
II.

A LAW AND ECONOMICS PRIMER
A.

Introduction

The traditional law and economics theory is based upon an opportunity-shaping theory of human behavior,28 which, in turn, is
based upon the premise that individuals desire to and act to maximize
their own personal preferences.29 When an individual is presented
27. Just as the hearsay exceptions apply across the board regardless of the age of the
victim or the nature of the crime, so too should the Maryland procedure.
28. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 1-2; see POSNER, supra note 13, at 223-24 (referring
to literature on crime that shows the response of criminals to changes in opportunity costs);
Becker, supra note 23, at 179 (explaining that a criminal will decide whether "crime pays"
based upon his or her attitude toward risk). See generally Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 5,
9 (describing how society may choose to influence individual behavior and the factors that
may affect an individual's decision to behave criminally).
29. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 3; see also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC AP-
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with a choice, the individual calculates the costs and benefits associat-

ed with the different options, and chooses the option which maximizes his or her personal preferences.3" In calculating the costs and benefits associated with the different options, however, the individual
calculates only (1) the costs imposed upon him or her, and (2) the

benefits he or she shall receive.3 Any costs and/or benefits imposed
upon third parties are not included in the individual's calculations
with respect to whether to engage in the activity.32
While the actor calculates the costs and benefits from a micro
point of view (the costs and benefits to the actor only), society calculates the costs and benefits from a macro point of view (the costs and
benefits to all affected parties).33 Society calculates the macro level

costs and benefits of different activities because society seeks to maximize

social

wealth by seeking

Pareto optimality. 34 In Pareto

optimality, society's resources are distributed among individuals in
such a manner that no redistribution of resources can be made among

the members of society without making another member worse off.35
In pursuit of Pareto optimality, society wants to encourage those
activities which result in a net social benefit and discourage those
activities which result in a net social cost.36 As long as an individual
considers only the costs and benefits to him or her from a contem-

plated activity, however, there is the risk that the individual will

PROACH To HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 3-4.
30. "This decision will depend on the individual's ...
opportunities, and the
individual's preferences with respect to these opportunities." Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at
5; see also BECKER, supra note 29, at 6-8; PHILLIPS & VOTEY, supra note 13, at 19-20;
POSNER, supra note 13, at 223.
31. See Becker, supra note 23, at 179; see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 5 (describing the decision to engage in crime as one in which the criminal opportunities are sufficiently remunerative to outweigh the non criminal opportunities). See generally BECKER, supra
note 29, at 3-14 (defining the economic approach to human behavior as the utility derived
from partaking in an activity versus the utility derived from not partaking).
32. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 8. These costslbenefits upon third parties are called
externalities because they are external to the actors decision making process. There is no
market in which the third parties can charge the actor for the external costs or in which the
actor can charge the third parties for the external benefits. Id. See generally POSNER, supra
note 13, at 71.
33. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYStS OF LAW 62, 205-12 (3d
ed. 1986); POSNER, supra note 13, at 71 (explaining which costs different entities will take
into account).
34. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 13; Becker, supra note 23, at 207; Dau-Schmidt,
supra note 23, at 6.
35. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 13; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 6.
36, See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 5.
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engage in activity which may result in a net benefit to him or her,
but the externality costs to third parties may be so high as to result

in a net social loss. 37 Accordingly, one of society's goals is to develop policies and mechanisms through which the external costs of activ-

ities are internalized to the activity and the individuals engaging in
the activities. 38 By internalizing the true costs of an activity, society

hopes that individuals will engage in only those activities which result
in both a net personal benefit and a net social benefit.39 One such
mechanism designed to internalize such externalities is the institution
of criminal law.4"
B.

The Law and Economics Theory of Criminal Law

Criminal activity is activity which imposes external costs upon
victims and other third parties which society deems to be unaccept-

able.' To deter individuals from engaging in such activity, society
punishes the individual who engages in the activity4 2 to internalize to
the actor the external costs the actor imposes upon the victim and
others.43
In theory then, the actor contemplating engaging in criminal

activity must include in his or her calculations the cost of the punishment he or she may receive for engaging in the activity." If the

punishment is severe enough, the costs of engaging in the activity
will exceed the benefits to the individual, and the individual will not
engage in the activity.4" One must remember, however, that unlike

37. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 8-9; Posner, supra note 23, at 1196-97.
38. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10.
39. See Becker, supra note 23, at 191-92; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10.
40. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 217-23; Becker, supra note 23, at 191 n.35, 192;
Posner, supra note 23, at 1201; see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10 (stating that
criminal sanctions are society's way of making criminal opportunities less remunerative).
41. See Becker, supra note 23, at 172-73; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 8; Posner,
supra note 23, at 1195-96.
42. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10 (construing Becker, supra note 23, at 191-92);
see also Posner, supra note 23, at 1195-96.
43. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 217-23; Becker, supra note 23, at 191 n.35, 192;
Posner, supra note 23, at 1201; see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10 (showing that
when the ex ante expected value of the penalty equals the external costs of the crime, those
external costs will be internalized).
44. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 223; Becker, supra note 23, at 180, 192; DauSchmidt, supra note 23, at 10.
45. POSNER, supra note 13, at 223; see also Becker, supra note 23, at 176, 191 n.35;
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10; Posner, supra note 23, at 1201.
A person commits a crime because the expected benefits of the crime to him exceed
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some of the other costs borne by the actor, punishment is not a certainty. The punishment imposed for engaging in the illegal activity
must be discounted by the probability that the actor will be apprehended and convicted.' Accordingly, for any given criminal activity,
the key is not the punishment which will be imposed if the defendant
is convicted, but rather the net punishment: the punishment if convicted, discounted by the probability of apprehension and conviction.
Thus, if an individual is contemplating engaging in a particular crime,
the individual includes in his or her calculations not the cost of the
absolute punishment which would be imposed if the individual were
caught and convicted, but the net punishment: the absolute punishment discounted by the probability of apprehension and conviction.47
The net punishment associated with each offense is important because
the net punishment is society's principal method of deterring people
from engaging in criminal activity. It is society's job to determine the
net punishment necessary to achieve the desired level of deterrence
for each offense. The desired level of deterrence means that in a
sufficient percentage of cases, when an individual who is contemplating engaging in the criminal activity includes in his or her calculations the net punishment associated with the activity, the net punishment causes the expected costs to the individual of engaging in the
activity to exceed the expected benefits. But determining the optimal
net punishment for each offense is not the end of the matter. Society
must also determine the appropriate and most efficient mix of the two
variables comprising the net punishment: (1) the severity of punishment, and (2) the probability of apprehension and conviction.48
In summary, the effective enforcement of criminal laws is important because it furthers the pursuit of Pareto optimality. Effective

the expected costs. The benefits are the various tangible (in the case of crimes of pecuniary

gain) or intangible (in the case of so-called crimes of passion) satisfactions from the criminal
act, The costs include various out-of-pocket expenses (for guns, burglar tools, masks, etc.),
the opportunity costs of the criminal's time, and the expected costs of criminal punishment.
POSNER, supra note 13, at 223.
46. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10 n.48; Posner, supra note 23, at 1199 n.13.

47. "[A] rational person would discount the costs of the criminal sanction by the probability he will actually suffer that sanction in deciding whether to commit the crime." DauSchmidt, supra note 23 at 10 n.48. See generally HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS 216-17 (1st. ed 1987); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONoMIc ANALYSIS 155-58
(2d ed. 1984).
48. POSNER, supra note 13, at 225; Posner, supra note 23, at 1206; see also Becker,

supra note 23, at 205 (identifying the need for an efficient mix of apprehension and conviction before criminals will be effectively discouraged from the criminal opportunity).
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enforcement of criminal laws is intended to discourage individuals
from engaging in conduct which may result in personal net benefits
to the principal actor, but which imposes such high costs upon the
victim and other third parties that the result is a net social loss. The
effective enforcement of criminal laws is achieved through the net
punishment associated with the criminal activity in question.
C. A Law and Economics Analysis of Child Sexual Abuse
Applying the law and economics theory of criminal law to child
sexual abuse, there is no doubt that child sexual abuse is conduct
which a society seeking Pareto optimality would seek to deter. Although the child sexual abuser may receive physical and psychological benefits from the activity, the costs to the child and to others
indirectly affected are unquestionable and enormous. In addition to
the obvious physical injuries the child may suffer, the literature is
replete with evidence of both immediate and long term psychological
damage and scarring to victims of child abuse.49 There is no doubt
that the social costs of child sexual abuse far exceed any benefits the
abuser may receive. The decision to criminalize child abuse is unquestionable. The effective enforcement of the child abuse laws simply requires that society set the net punishment for the crime high
enough that the desired level of deterrence is achieved.
HI.

A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE

RIGHT TO FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION IN THE EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAWS

At first blush, one might think that the Confrontation Clause's
right to face-to-face confrontation, or for that matter anything which
hinders the prosecution of criminals, is counter to the law and economics goal of the effective enforcement of criminal laws. It is well
recognized that the Confrontation Clause may impose a cost upon the
complainant or witness in terms of the uneasiness, and in some cases
even trauma, which face-to-face confrontation may cause." More-

49.

DEBRA WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSE-

CUTORS 17-18 (1985); Mary Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potentialfor Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4 (1983); David Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a
Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 187,
233 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1980). See generally GAIL S. GOODMAN ET AL., TESTIFYING IN
CRIMINAL COURT: EMOTIONAL EFFECTS ON CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS 44-62 (1992).

50. "To be sure, face-to-face confrontation may be said to cause trauma ....
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over, there is the risk that the victim's apparent reluctance to testify
face-to-face against the defendant because of the emotional distress

involved may be misinterpreted by the finder of fact as indicating that
the witness is lying." If the finder of fact misinterprets the witness's
emotional distress and acquits a guilty defendant because the finder of
fact incorrectly believes the witness is lying, the effect is to decrease
the net punishment associated with the crime in question. 2 If Pareto

optimality is furthered by the effective enforcement of criminal laws,
and if the effective enforcement of criminal laws is furthered by
maintaining the optimal net punishment, how then does the Confrontation Clause's right to face-to-face confrontation further the effective
enforcement of criminal laws? 3 The answer lies in the benefits of
face-to-face confrontation.
A.

The Law and Economics Theory of ProceduralRules

Substantive rules of law affect human behavior by creating in-

centives for people to act in a way which maximizes social wealth.'
Some conduct may produce a net benefit to the actor but a net loss

land v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856 (1990). "[F]ace to face presence may, unfortunately, upset
the truthful rape victim or [the] abused child." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
"Many states have determined that a child victim may suffer trauma from exposure to the
harsh atmosphere of the typical courtroom.
... Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
also supra note 3 (discussing distress, anxiety, and trauma of witnesses who testify in open
court).
51. "[T]he fear and trauma associated with a child's testimony in front of the defendant . . . may so overwhelm the child as to prevent the possibility of effective testimony,
thereby undermining the truth-finding function of the trial itself." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1032
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual
Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MiAMI L. REv. 181, 203-04 (1985); Paula
E, Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85
MICH. L. REv. 809, 813-20 (1987).
52. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 553.
53. The rationale behind the right to face-to-face confrontation is that although face-toface confrontation may cause the witness some uneasiness and even trauma, the accused has
the absolute right to have the finder of fact decide if the witness's uneasiness is because the
witness is lying, or because the witness is nervous or upset. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020; see
also Herbert v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 855 (Ct. App.
1981)
The historical concept of the right of confrontation has included the right to see
one's accusers face-to-face, thereby giving the fact-finder the opportunity of weighing the demeanor of the accused when forced to make his or her accusation before
the one person who knows if the witness is truthful. A witness's reluctance to face
the accused may be the product of fabrication rather than fear or embarrassment.
Herbert, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
54. See supra notes 29, 34. 35 and accompanying text.
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to society. Society wants to discourage such conduct. Accordingly,
society creates incentives in the form of civil and criminal penalties
which are imposed if a person breaches the substantive rule. If the
penalty, when added to the actor's other expected costs of engaging
in the act, results in a sum which is greater than the expected benefit,
the rational actor will not engage in the activity.55 The penalty, however, has to be discounted by the risk that there may be an erroneous
judgment. If the sum of the expected penalty (the penalty discounted
by the probability of an erroneous judgment) plus the actor's other
expected costs is less than the expected benefit, the substantive rule
will not deter the rational actor. The actor will engage in the activity
even though it results in a net social loss. The net social loss incurred
as a result of an erroneous judgment is the "cost of error" associated
with the judicial process. 6
Procedural rules are intended to reduce the risk of an erroneous
judgment, and thus the expected cost of error, at a cost which results
in a net benefit to society. 7
The objective of a procedural system, viewed economically, is
to minimize the sum of two types of cost. The first is the cost of
erroneous judicial decisions. Suppose the expected cost of a particular type of accident is $100 and the cost to the potential injurer of
avoiding it is $90 (the cost of avoidance by the victim, we will
assume, is greater than $100). If the potential injurer is subject to
either a negligence or a strict liability standard, he will avoid the
accident-assuming the standard is administered accurately. But
suppose that in 15 percent of the cases in which an accident occurs,
the injurer can expect to avoid liability because of erroneous factual
determinations by the procedural system. Then the expected cost of
the accident to the injurer will fall to $85, and since this is less
than the cost of avoidance to him ($90), the accident will not be
prevented. The result will be a net social loss of $10-or will it?
We must not ignore the cost of operating the procedural system. Suppose that to reduce the rate of erroneous failures to impose
liability from 15 percent to below 10 percent would require an
additional investment in the procedural system of $20 per accident.
Then we should tolerate the 15 percent probability of error, because
the cost of error ($10) is less than the cost necessary to eliminate it

55. See
portunities to
56. See
57. See

Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 3 ("[P]eople rationally choose among their opachieve the greatest satisfaction of their preferences.").
POSNER, supra note 13, at 549.
id.; see also supra notes 14, 34-39 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, in analyzing the benefits of a procedural rule, the comparison is between: (1) the expected cost of error without the procedural rule ("CE w/out PR"), and (2) the sum of (i) the expected cost
of error with the procedural rule ("CE w/ PR"), plus (ii) the expected
direct costs of the procedural rule ("C of PR"):
(CE w/out PR) vs. (CE w/ PR) + (C of PR).
Inasmuch as society's goal is to minimize the social costs associated with the effective enforcement and administration of criminal
laws, the key is whether the expected cost of error can be reduced at
a cost which is less than the net reduction in the expected cost of
error. A procedural rule should be adopted only if (1) the sum of (i)
the expected cost of error under the procedural rule coupled with (ii)
the expected direct cost of the procedural rule is less than (2) the
expected cost of error without the procedural rule. If the expected
cost of error without the procedural rule is less than the sum of the
expected cost of error with the procedural rule plus the expected
direct cost of the rule (i.e., if the left side of the formula is less than
the right side), the benefits of the procedural rule do not justify its
cost, and the procedure should not be employed. On the other hand,
if the expected cost of error without the procedural rule is greater
than the sum of the expected cost of error with the procedural rule
plus the expected direct cost of the rule (i.e., if the left side of the
formula is greater than the right), adopting the procedural rule would
result in a net social benefit, and the procedure should be adopted.
The economic formula for the analysis of procedural rules can be
applied to the procedural right to face-to-face confrontation. The
economic formula and analysis will help to explain the traditional
view that the defendant had an absolute right to face-to-face confrontation and will serve as the basis for analyzing whether the Court's
opinion in Maryland v. Craig59 is consistent with a law and economics analysis.

58. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 549. See generally RICHARD H. FIELD Er AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (6th ed. 1990); CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 398-724 (4th ed. 1983).

59. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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B. A Law and Economics Analysis of the Right to Face-to-Face
Confrontation
Applying the economic analysis of procedural rules to the right
to face-to-face confrontation in criminal cases, the analysis requires
the comparison of the sum of the expected cost of error with the
right to face-to-face confrontation ("CE w/ FTFC"), plus the expected
direct cost of the right ("C of FTFC"), versus the expected cost of
error in the absence of the right to face-to-face confrontation ("CE
w/out FTFC"):
(CE w/ FTFC) + (C of FTFC) vs. (CE w/out FTFC).
The first step in the analysis is to calculate the net reduction in the
expected cost of error: to compare the expected cost of error with the
right to face-to-face confrontation ("CE w/ FTFC") versus the expected cost of error without the right to face-to-face confrontation ("CE
w/out FTFC").
The expected cost of error is the expected cost of an erroneous
judicial decision ("C of ED") times the probability of an erroneous
judicial decision ("P of ED"):
CE = (C of ED) x (P of ED).
Each of these two variables, however, can be further broken down. In
a criminal case there are potentially two types of erroneous judicial
decisions: an erroneous conviction ("EC") and an erroneous acquittal
("EA"). Moreover, each type of erroneous judicial decision may have
its own probability of occurring. Therefore, a more accurate statement
of the expected cost of error must give separate consideration to each
variable in the computation:
CE = (C of EC) x (P of EC) + (C of EA) x (P of EA).
The crux of the analysis then is to assign values to each of these
variables for each of the possible scenarios: the expected cost of error
with the right to face-to-face confrontation, and the expected cost of
error without the right to face-to-face confrontation. In assigning
values, the first variables to consider are the expected cost of an
erroneous conviction and the expected cost of an erroneous acquittal.
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1. The Expected Cost of an Erroneous Conviction and the
Expected Cost of an Erroneous Acquittal
Consistent with the economic analysis of the institution of criminal laws, the expected cost of an erroneous conviction is much greater than the expected cost of an erroneous acquittal:'
C of EC > C of EA.
The truth of this assertion, while arguably self-evident, can be established by considering more carefully the costs of each. First, both an
erroneous conviction and an erroneous acquittal affect the net punishment for an offense by decreasing the probability that those who
actually engage in the criminal activity will be apprehended and convicted.6' The result is a net social loss limited to the "increase in the
[total] social cost of crime as a result of [having] reduc[ed] . .. the

probability of punishing criminal activity."'62 For an erroneous acquittal, this is the only cost.63 In the case of an erroneous conviction,
however, there is an even greater net social loss. In addition to the
net social loss caused by the decrease in the net punishment for the,
criminal activity, the individual erroneously convicted incurs all of the
costs associated with his or her wrongful conviction and punishment,
and society incurs all of the costs inherent in imposing the punishment.' The individual wrongly convicted of a crime no doubt suffers great personal costs: the social stigma and psychological costs
inherent in any criminal conviction (the latter no doubt enhanced by
the fact that the defendant knows it is an erroneous conviction); potential loss of employment costs; and if the conviction entails imprisonment, the costs inherent in the loss of one's freedom.' In addition, society incurs whatever costs are inherent in the administration
of the defendant's punishment.' If the defendant is put on probation,
society incurs the administrative costs inherent in supervising the
60. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 553.

61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. An argument can be made that even where a guilty defendant is acquitted,

the defendant incurs the costs of his or her defense and incurs the more abstract costs associated with being charged with a crime. These additional costs may be sufficient to make the
defendant better appreciate the costs of criminal conduct, thereby discouraging at least that
defendant from engaging in further criminal activity.

64. See id.
65. See id.; see also Becker, supra note 23, at 179-80.
66, See POSNER, supra note 13, at 227, 553; see also Becker, supra note 23, at 179-80.
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probation. If the defendant is sentenced to prison, society incurs all of
the costs inherent in incarcerating an individual. Accordingly, in evaluating the cost of error for a criminal case, the aggregate cost of an
erroneous conviction is substantially greater than the cost of an erroneous acquittal,' and thus most of the procedural rules in the criminal justice system are intended to minimize the risk of an erroneous
conviction (i.e., the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof).
The second point to notice about the expected cost of an erroneous conviction and the expected cost of an erroneous acquittal is that
each of the respective expected costs is the same regardless of whether or not the defendant is accorded the right to face-to-face confrontation:
C of EC w/ FTFC = C of EC w/out FTFC;
C of EA w/ FTFC = C of EA w/out FfFC.
The net social loss resulting from the reduced probability of punishing the criminal activity, inherent in both an erroneous conviction and
an erroneous acquittal, is the same regardless of the presence of the
right to face-to-face confrontation. Moreover, the costs to the individual and the costs to society inherent in imposing the punishment upon
an erroneously convicted individual are the same regardless of the
presence of the right to face-to-face confrontation." The right to
face-to-face confrontation does not affect the respective expected costs
of an erroneous conviction or an erroneous acquittal. Thus, in comparing the expected cost of error with and without the right to faceto-face confrontation, the focus shifts to the respective probabilities of
an erroneous judgment. 9

67. POSNER, supra note 13, at 553. It would take "several erroneous acquittals to impose a social cost equal to that of one erroneous conviction for the same offense." Id. Hence
the maxim "it is better to acquit ten guilty defendants than to convict one innocent defendant." This maxim is supportable from a law and economics perspective. Following Maryland
v. Craig, however, there may be a new maxim: it is better for one innocent defendant to be
found guilty than for one victim to be traumatized by face-to-face confrontation.
68. One might argue there is a slightly reduced cost to a conviction without the right to

face-to-face confrontation in that society may not trust the conviction as much. But any such
reduction in the cost is minimal at most.
69. The first step in the analysis of the economic worth of the right to face-to-face

confrontation was to compare the total cost of error with and without the right. The total
cost of error is the cost of an erroneous conviction times the probability of
conviction plus the cost of an erroneous acquittal times the probability of an
quittal. Although no absolute values can be assigned to any of these variables,
of magnitude variables can be assigned based upon the analysis: the cost of
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2. The Probability of an Erroneous

Conviction and the

Probability of an Erroneous Acquittal
As established above, there are two probabilities of error: the

probability of an erroneous conviction (P of EC) and the probability
of an erroneous acquittal (P of EA). While the respective expected
costs of an erroneous conviction and an erroneous acquittal can be
compared to each other rather easily, it is not as easy to compare the
respective probabilities of an erroneous conviction and an erroneous
acquittal to each other.7" It is, however, relatively easy to compare
each variable to itself across the two possible scenarios: the probabili-

ty of each with and without the right to face-to-face confrontation:
P of EC w/ FTFC <4 P of EC w/out FTFC;
P of EA w/ FTFC <4 P of EA w/out FTFC.

On the one hand, the probability of an erroneous conviction is
much greater if there were no right to face-to-face confrontation than
if there were face-to-face confrontation:
P of EC w/out FTFC > P of EC w/ FTFC.

This observation follows from the generally accepted principle that it

conviction is 100 while the cost of an erroneous acquittal is 10. Thus the following formulas
for the total cost with and without the right to face-to-face confrontation:
TC w/ FTFC = (C of EC) x (P of EC) + (C of EA) x (P of EA)
VS.

TC w/o FTFC = (C of EC) x (P of EC) + (C of EA) x (P of EA)
can be rewritten:
TC w/ FTFC = 100 x (P of EC) + 10 x (P of EA)
VS.
TC wlo FTFC = 100 x (P of EC) + 10 x (P of EA).
70. Based upon the number of procedural rules designed to reduce the probability of an
erroneous conviction, however, including the requirement that guilt be established beyond
reasonable doubt, the better view, and hence the starting point for any comparison, is that at
least for the scenario when the defendant is entitled to the right to face-to-face confrontation,
the probability of an erroneous acquittal is greater than the probability of an erroneous conviction. This theory is implied by the Court's understanding that the Confrontation Clause
may "upset the truthful rape victim or abused child." Coy v Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020
(1988); see also Id. at 1032 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing how the possible trauma
will block any attempt to discover the truth thus leading to possible erroneous acquittals);
POSNER, supra note 13, at 553-54.
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is more difficult to tell a damaging lie about a person to their face.7'
Thus, requiring a witness in a criminal case to testify face-to-face
against the defendant significantly decreases the probability of an
erroneous conviction in two ways. First, the right to face-to-face confrontation reduces the probability that a witness would actually tell a
lie about the defendant. And second, the right to face-to-face confrontation increases the probability that if the witness does lie, the trier of
fact could detect the fabrication. Accordingly, if the witness were
permitted to testify without face-to-face confrontation, the probability
of an erroneous conviction is significantly higher than the probability
of an erroneous conviction if face-to-face confrontation were required.
While the right to face-to-face confrontation should significantly
decrease the probability of an erroneous conviction, the right to faceto-face confrontation should increase the probability of an erroneous
acquittal:
P of EA w/ FTFC > P of EA w/out FTFC.
This increase, however, arguably is not as great as the decrease in the
probability of an erroneous conviction. The increase in the probability
of an erroneous acquittal stems from the risk that the trier of fact
may misinterpret a witness's apparent reluctance to testify face-to-face
against the defendant as evidence that the witness is lying."2 The
vast majority of witnesses, however, experience no, or minimal, emotional distress from testifying face-to-face against a defendant. Accordingly, under the right to face-to-face confrontation, it is reasonable to assume that the increase in the probability of an erroneous
acquittal should be less than the decrease in the probability of an
erroneous conviction.
Even assuming, however, that the increase in the probability of
an erroneous acquittal with face-to-face confrontation equalled the
decrease in the probability of an erroneous conviction, the expected
cost of error with the right to face-to-face confrontation would still be
less than the expected cost of error without the right.73 This is due

71.

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20).

72. See Herbert v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 855 (Ct. App. 1981).
73. The first step in the analysis of the economic worth of the right to face-to-face

confrontation was to compare the total cost of error with and without the right. The total
cost of error is the cost of an erroneous conviction times the probability of an erroneous
conviction plus the cost of an erroneous acquittal times the probability of an erroneous acquittal. Although no absolute values can be assigned to any of these variables, relative order
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to the actual costs of the respective errors. As noted above, an erroneous acquittal results in a net social loss limited to the extent of the
increase in criminal activity which occurs as a result of the decrease
in the net punishment for the criminal activity. On the other hand, an

erroneous conviction results in a net social loss not only to the extent
of the increase in criminal activity which occurs as a result of the
decrease in the net punishment, but the erroneous conviction also in-

of magnitude variables can be assigned based upon the analysis. Based upon the analysis of
the probabilities of an erroneous conviction and the probability of an erroneous acquittal,
relative numbers can be assigned to these variables. The statement that more procedural rules
are designed to reduce the risk of an erroneous conviction than the risk of an erroneous
acquittal implies that the risk of an erroneous acquittal in fact may be higher than the risk of
an erroneous conviction. Accordingly, the following formulas for the total cost error with and
without the right to face-to-face confrontation:
TCE w/ FTFC = (C of EC) x (P of EC) + (C of EA) x (P of EA)
vs.
TCE w/o FTFC = (C of EC) x (P of EC) + (C of EA) x (P of EA)
can be rewritten:
TCE w/ FIFC = (C of EC) x 10% + (C of EA) x 20%
VS.
TCE w/o FTFC = (C of EC) x 15% + (C of EA) x 22%
Numbers were assigned to the cost of an erroneous conviction and cost of an erroneous
acquittal above based on the analysis of those variables. Inserting those numbers into the
formulas developed above, the formulas can be rewritten:
TCE w/ FTFC = 100 x 10% + 10 x 20%
VS.
TCE w/o FTFC = 100 x 15% + 10 x 22%.
Completing the calculations, the total cost of error with and without the right to face-to-face
confrontation are:
TCE w/ FTFC = 10 + 2 = 12
VS.
TCE w/o FTFC = 15 + 2.2 = 17.2
The total cost of error with the right to face-to-face confrontation is less than the total cost
of error without the right to face-to-face confrontation. This is true even if the increase in
the probability of an erroneous conviction equals the increase in the probability of an erroneous acquittal, or if the probability of an erroneous acquittal is less than the probability of an
erroneous conviction. As long as the cost of an erroneous conviction is greater than the cost
of an erroneous acquittal, and the increase in the probability of an erroneous acquittal is no
greater than the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction, the total cost of error
with the right to face-to-face confrontation will always be less than the total cost of error
without the right to face-to-face confrontation.
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volves the additional costs to the individual from his or her wrongful
conviction and punishment, and the additional costs society incurs in
imposing the punishment.74 Accordingly, as long as the decrease in

the probability of an erroneous conviction with face-to-face confrontation equals or exceeds the increase in the probability of an erroneous
acquittal, the expected cost of error with the right to face-to-face

confrontation must be lower than the expected cost of error without
the right to face-to-face confrontation:

CE w/ FTFC < CE w/out FrFC.
Accordingly, since society wants to minimize the expected cost of
error, society will be better off adopting the right to face-to-face

confrontation as long as the benefit from the net reduction in the cost
of error is greater than the expected direct cost of face-to-face con-

frontation ("C of FTFC"):75

74. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. Although no absolute figures can be
assigned to the economic costs a witness suffers in having to confront the defendant face-toface and to the economic benefits society incurs from the reduced risk of an erroneous conviction, the order of magnitude of the latter arguably is greater than the order of magnitude
of the former. An erroneous conviction involves costs to both the individual defendant in
question and to society. The individual defendant suffers psychological costs and potentially
lost employment costs. Becker, supra note 23, at 179-80. Society incurs the costs inherent in
punishing the defendant. If the defendant is placed on probation, there are administrative costs
involved in supervising the defendant's probation. If the conviction requires imprisonment, the
obvious costs of imprisonment can be staggering. Thus, the aggregate costs of an erroneous
conviction can be enormous. POSNER, supra note 13, at 227, 553; Becker, supra note 23, at
179-80. On the other hand, the costs face-to-face confrontation imposes on the witness arguably are relatively limited psychological costs. First of all, the psychological costs are secondary and incremental in nature in the sense that the bulk of the psychological costs were
inflicted when the crime was committed. Moreover, not all witnesses will suffer meaningful
emotional distress from face-to-face confrontation. The amount of distress inflicted will vary
based upon the crime in question and the person. See Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856 (1990) (implying by its requirement of "more than de minimis" trauma that the effect of confrontation
will indeed vary with each witness). Accordingly, the net emotional distress inflicted in any
given case arguably is less than the net benefit from the reduced risk of an erroneous judgment.
75. The differential between the total cost of error with the right to face-to-face confrontation and the total cost of error without the right will depend on: (1) the magnitude of
the differential between the cost of an erroneous conviction and the cost of an erroneous
acquittal; (2) the magnitude of the differential between the probability of an erroneous conviction with and without the right to face-to-face confrontation; and (3) the magnitude of the
differential between the probability of an erroneous conviction with and without the right to
face-to-face confrontation. Inasmuch as no absolute values can be assigned to any of these
differentials, there is no way to determine the absolute net benefit derived from the right to
face-to-face confrontation.
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CE w/out FTFC - CE w/FrFC < C of FFC.
3. The Expected Direct Cost of Face-to-Face Confrontation
The principal cost of the right to face-to-face confrontation is the
anxiety or emotional distress a witness may experience from having
to testify face-to-face against the defendant.76 In contrast to the cost
of an erroneous conviction or an erroneous acquittal, which are more
objective and quantifiable in nature (and thus lend themselves more
easily to an economic analysis), the cost of anxiety or emotional
distress is more subjective and not as easily calculable. Nonetheless,
as evidenced daily in tort claims, calculating the cost of anxiety or
emotional distress is possible and something society does routinely. '
Moreover, the economic analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation does not require an absolute determination of the cost of faceto-face confrontation, only a qualitative order of magnitude computation relative to the net benefit derived from the reduction in the
expected cost of error.
The key to calculating the expected direct cost of face-to-face
confrontation is to remember that not all witnesses experience emotional distress, and that those who do experience different degrees of
emotional distress. Whether or not a witness experiences emotional
distress from face-to-face confrontation is a function of the crime in
question, the particular facts of how the crime was committed in that
particular case, and the emotional make-up of that particular witness.
The point, however, is that just as the cost of error is the expected
cost of an erroneous judgment (the probability of an erroneous judgment times the cost of an erroneous judgment), the cost to the witness from face-to-face confrontation is the expected cost (the weighted average of the different possible costs of emotional distress times
the probability a witness would experience each such amount of emotional distress).78
The task of analyzing the expected cost of face-to-face confrontation to the witness is a two step process: (1) assessing the cost of the
different degrees of emotional distress a witness may experience; and
(2) assessing the probability that a witness will experience each such
76. See supra note 3.
77. See e.g., Garfoot v. Avila, 261 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (Ct. App. 1989) ("A plaintiff in
a personal injury action is entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering proximately
caused by the defendant and calculation is left to the 'subjective discretion' of the jury").
78. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 553-54; see also CHARLES J. GO-TZ, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 77-79 (1984).
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amount of emotional distress. 9 For the vast majority of witnesses,
the amount of emotional distress from face-to-face confrontation is
negligible. For these witnesses there is little doubt that the net benefit
of face-to-face confrontation in terms of the reduced risk of an erroneous judgment exceeds the cost of the anxiety the witness may
experience from face-to-face confrontation. There are, however, extraordinary cases where the witness would experience severe emotional distress and even trauma from face-to-face confrontation."0 In such
cases, the cost of the trauma to the witness may even exceed the net
benefit derived from the reduction in the total cost of error attributable to the right to face-to-face confrontation. But these cases are the
exception, and as such are statistically insignificant when compared to
the overwhelming majority of the witnesses for whom the cost of the
emotional distress from face-to-face confrontation is minimal. Thus,
even when the limited number of cases in which the cost of the
emotional trauma is substantial are included in the computations,
because the cost of face-to-face confrontation is negligible in the
overwhelming majority of the cases, the expected cost of face-to-face
confrontation is still less than 'the expected benefit of face-to-face
confrontation. While this conclusion is based more upon intuitive,
order of magnitude economic analysis than definitive calculations, this
intuitive conclusion is supported by the Confrontation Clause"' and
Supreme Court case law prior to Maryland v. Craig."
In the end, the comparison of the expected costs and benefits of
face-to-face confrontation is as much qualitative as quantitative. Although the separate analysis of each variable gives some sense of the
order of magnitude of each, since no absolute numbers can be assigned to any of the variables the final comparison is highly qualita-

79. See GOErz, supra note 78, at 77-79.
80. See supra note 3.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
82. Although a law and economics analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation is
helpful, there are limitations to the analysis. Inasmuch as no definitive values can be assigned
to any of the variables, the analysis is as much intuitive as numerical, and more order of
magnitude than definitive. Nevertheless, there is a high degree of certainty in the conclusion
that face-to-face confrontation reduces the total cost of error by decreasing the probability of
an erroneous conviction. In addition, there is a high degree of certainty in the conclusion that
face-to-face confrontation has a potentially significant cost associated with it in some cases in
terms of the emotional distress to the witness. The key then is comparing the magnitudes of
these respective costs and benefits. The economic analysis, based on intuitive as much as
numerical analysis, supports the conclusion that the expected benefit exceeds the expected
cost; and this conclusion is supported by the case law prior to Maryland v. Craig. See cases
cited supra notes 4-5.
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tive. Until Maryland v. Craig, the Confrontation Clause arguably
represented, and traditionally had been interpreted as standing for, a
constitutional presumption that the expected economic benefits of
face-to-face confrontation when the witness appears and testifies exceed the expected costs of the emotional distress the witness may
experience.83 The traditional presumption that the Confrontation
Clause includes the right to face-to-face confrontation is consistent

with a law and economics analysis. It is against this economic background that the Court's opinion and holding in Maryland v. Craig
should be evaluated.
IV.

THE COURT'S OPINION IN MARYLAND V. CRAIG

In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court confronted the constitutionality of a Maryland statute which permits child abuse victims to

testify via one-way closed circuit television in lieu of testifying
against the defendant face-to-face in the courtroom.' 4 The statute
83. Viewed abstractly, this presumption is reasonable both from an aggregate perspective
and from an individual perspective. The expected cost of the amount of uneasiness experienced by a witness as a result of face-to-face confrontation is minimal, while the expected
costs associated with the increased risk of an erroneous conviction in the absence of the right
to face-to-face confrontation are substantial. While some witnesses may be reluctant to testify
face-to-face against a defendant, and a few may even experience trauma, the potential uneasiness and trauma pales in comparison to the costs incurred both to the individual and to
society if an innocent defendant is wrongly convicted. Moreover, if the potential trauma to a
potential witness were that severe, the worst that can happen is that the witness does not
testify and defendant is erroneously acquitted. As established above, the cost of an erroneous
acquittal pales in comparison to the cost of an erroneous conviction.
Rather than subjecting the right to face-to-face confrontation to a costly case by case
cost-benefit analysis, it has long been held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment constituted a constitutional presumption that the benefits of face-to-face confrontation
exceed the costs of face-to-face confrontation. The courts were not to engage in a case by
case evaluation of the costs and benefits. The problem is the Supreme Court's opinion in
Maryland v. Craig appears to cast aside this long held presumption and open the gates to
eliminating face-to-face confrontation anytime the other elements of the Confrontation Clause
are preserved and the witness may suffer more than de minimis trauma.
84. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 842 (1990). The Maryland statute in question,
provides in pertinent part:
(a)
(1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the
Family Law Article or Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a
court may order that the testimony of a child victim be
taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by
means of a closed circuit television if:
(i)
The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child
victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child can-
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permits child abuse victims to testify via the closed circuit television
if "[t]he judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the

courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.""5 Once the
judge makes such a determination, the victim, the prosecuting attorney, and the attorney for the defendant retire to a separate room
where the child testifies via one-way closed circuit television. 6 At
no time during the child's testimony is the child physically present in
the same room as the defendant. Moreover, inasmuch as the closed

circuit television is one-way, at no time during the child's testimony
does the child even see the defendant. 7 In Maryland v. Craig, the
defendant objected to the use of the closed circuit testimony on the
grounds that the Maryland procedure violates a defendant's right to
face-to-face confrontation as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause

of the Sixth Amendment. 8

(2)

(b)

not reasonably communicate.
Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant,
and the judge may question the child.

the following persons may be in the room with the
when the child testifies by closed circuit television:
the prosecuting attorney;
the attorney for the defendant.

(1)

Only
child
(i)
(ii)

(3)

The judge and the defendant may be allowed to communicate with the persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate method.

This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for the purposes of
identification of the defendant, the presence of both the victim and
the defendant in the courtroom at the same time.
MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JuD. PROC. § 9-102 (Supp. 1993).
85. Craig, 497 U.S. at 841 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 9102(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1993)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 841-42.
88. Id. at 842.
(d)
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The Supreme Court's Analysis

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment expressly
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 9 In
Maryland v. Craig, the Court began its opinion by expressly acknowledging that the Court had traditionally and repeatedly interpreted the
Confrontation Clause as guaranteeing the defendant the right to "a
face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact."9 The Court noted, however, that it had never held "that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right
to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial."' The
Court then distinguished Maryland v. Craig from the precedents by
indicating that in Maryland v. Craig the trial court had made individualized findings that each of the child witnesses would experience
trauma unless accorded special protection.92 Since the special protection accorded under the Maryland procedure included depriving the
defendant of the right to face-to-face confrontation, the issue was
"'whether any exceptions exist' to the 'irreducible literal meaning of
the Clause: "a right to meet
face to face all those who appear and
93
give evidence at trial.'
The Court began its analysis of the issue by setting forth the
purpose of the Confrontation Clause: "[t]he central concern of the
Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."' The
Court stated that the Confrontation Clause furthers this purpose not
only through face-to-face confrontation, but also by:
(1) insur[ing] that the witness will give his statements under
oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and
guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury;
(2) forc[ing] the witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"; [and] (3)
permit[ing] the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to-observe

89. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
90. Craig, 497 U.S. at 844 (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 845.
93. Id. at 844 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 140, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
94. Id. at 845.
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the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding
the jury in assessing his credibility.'
Having established that the Confrontation Clause is made up of four
distinct elements, "physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact,"9 the Court then shifted its analysis to the element of physical presence: the right to faceto-face confrontation.
Although the Court acknowledged both the substantive and symbolic benefits of the right to face-to-face confrontation,' and that
"face-to-face confrontation forms 'the core of the values furthered by
the Confrontation Clause,"' 99 the Court stated that it had "nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation
right."" "[We have never insisted on an actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every instance in which testimony is admitted against a
defendant."'' In support of its position, the Court noted the numerous hearsay exceptions which permit testimony to be admitted against
a defendant without the defendant being able to confront the declarant
face-to-face.' ' Accordingly, the Court concluded that although the
Confrontation Clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,"1 2 the right to confront face-to-face witnesses appearing
at trial is not "an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the right to confront one's accusers."' 3 Rather, the
Court ruled that a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation may
be denied "where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy and
. . . where the reliability of the testi' 04
assured."'
otherwise
is
mony
Having established that the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation may be denied if necessary to further an important public
policy as long as the reliability of the evidence is otherwise assured,

95. Id. at 845-46 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).

96. Id. at 846.
97. Id. at 84647 (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017, 1019-20; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 63 n.6 (1980)).
98. Id. at 847 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 157).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 84749 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States

v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407
(1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).

102. Id. at 849 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63).
103. Id. at 849-50.
104. Id. at 850 (citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021).
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the Court then turned its attention to whether the Maryland statutory
procedure in question furthers an important public policy and otherwise assures the reliability of the testimony. The Court had no
trouble concluding that Maryland's one way closed circuit television
procedure otherwise assures the reliability of the testimony:
Maryland's statutory procedure, when invoked, prevents a child
witness from seeing the defendant as he or she testifies against the
defendant at trial. We find it significant, however, that Maryland's
procedure preserves all of the other elements of the confrontation
right: The child witness must be competent to testify and must
testify under oath; the defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the judge, jury, and defendant are
able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of
the witness as he or she testifies. Although we are mindful of the
many subtle effects face-to-face confrontation may have on an adversary criminal proceeding, the presence of these other elements of
confrontation-oath, cross-examination, and observation of the
witness' demeanor-adequately ensures that the testimony is both
reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony ....
Indeed, to the extent the child witness' testimony may be said to be
technically given out-of-court (though we do not so hold), these
assurances of reliability and adversariness are far greater than those
required for admission of hearsay testimony under the Confrontation
Clause . . . . We are therefore confident that use of the one-way
closed circuit television procedure, where necessary to further an
important state interest, does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or
symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause. 5
The Court then turned its attention to the "critical inquiry in this
case . . whether use of the [one way closed circuit television] proce6
dure is necessary to further an important state interest."'
The State of Maryland argued that it had a "substantial interest
in protecting children who are allegedly victims of child abuse from
the trauma of testifying against the alleged perpetrator and that its
statutory procedure for receiving testimony from such witnesses is
necessary to further that interest."' 7 In analyzing whether this state
interest qualified as an important state interest, the Court noted that it
had previously held that the State's interest in protecting the physical

105. Id. at 851-52 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).

106. Id. at 852.
107. Id.
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and psychological well-being of minor victims is a compelling state

interest which has warranted limiting other constitutionally protected
rights.'

The Court noted the extensive literature documenting the

trauma that child abuse victims may experience from face-to-face
confrontation." 9 Accordingly, the Court concluded that it would not
second-guess the Maryland Legislature with respect to its decision
that Maryland has a substantial interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of alleged child abuse victims from the

trauma associated with testifying against the alleged perpetrator."'
Lastly, the Court emphasized that the necessity of invoking the
statutory procedure must be made on a case-by-case basis."' Furthermore, the necessity must be based upon the state's interest in
protecting the witness from the trauma produced by the presence of
the defendant, not simply the courtroom atmosphere generally."'
The Court remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent

with its opinion."3
B. The Dissent
The dissent began and ended its opinion by arguing that the
express text of the Confrontation Clause categorically guarantees the

right to face-to-face confrontation,'

and hence the Court has no

authority to subject the Clause to the "interest-balancing" analysis to

108. Id. at 852-53 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk
County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
168 (1944)).
109. Id. at 854-55.
110. Id. at 855.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 856.
113. Id. at 860.
114. Id. at 860-61, 870. Justice Scalia wraps up his dissent by arguing on procedural
grounds that even if the trauma associated with the right to face-to-face confrontation in child
abuse cases does disserve the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal, the proper procedure
for remedying the net loss would be a Constitutional amendment, not a construction of the
Confrontation Clause which repudiates the express words of the Constitution. Justice Scalia's
argument poses an interesting issue from a law and economics perspective. Inasmuch as a
substantial majority of the states had already adopted protection measures similar to the one
at issue in Maryland v. Craig, is it more efficient to require the states to go through the
process of amending the Constitution to achieve the end they are seeking, or is it more efficient for the Court, in essence, to amend the Constitution through its construction of the
Constitution in light of the actions of a substantial majority of the states?
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which it was subjected." 5 The dissent, however, was not content to
rest on its procedural objections.
The dissent also sharply attacked the substance of the Court's
opinion, taking issue with each step of the Court's analysis. The
dissent disagreed with the Court's characterization of the purpose of
the Confrontation Clause: "[Tihe Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that
were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which
was 'face-to-face' confrontation.""' 6 The dissent disagreed with the
Court's characterization of the Confrontation Clause: "[tihe Court
makes the impossible plausible by recharacterizing the Confrontation
Clause, so that confrontation (redesignated 'face-to-face confrontation')
becomes only one of many 'elements of confrontation . . . .' This
reasoning abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates
the right.""' 7 The dissent objected to the Court's attempt to rephrase
the issue as simply whether the right to face-to-face confrontation is
an indispensable element of the Confrontation Clause, an issue which
the Court had already resolved in the hearsay context:
The Court supports its antitextual conclusion by cobbling together scraps of dicta from various cases that have no bearing
here .... Roberts, and all the other "precedents" the Court enlists
to prove the implausible, dealt with the implications of the Confrontation Clause, and not its literal, unavoidable text. When Roberts
said that the Clause merely "reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial," what it had in mind as the nonpreferred
alternative was not (as the Court implies) the appearance of a witness at trial without confronting the defendant. That has been, until
today, not merely "nonpreferred" but utterly unheard-of. What Roberts had in mind was the receipt of other-than-first-hand testimony
from witnesses at trial-that is, witnesses' recounting of hearsay
statements by absent parties who, since they did not appear at trial,
did not have to endure face-to-face confrontation . . . [Tihat the
defendant should be confronted by the witnesses who appear at trial
is not a preference "reflected" by the Confrontation Clause; it is a
constitutional right unqualifiedly guaranteed."'
The dissent attacked the Court's characterization of the State's interest

115. Id. at 861, 870.

116. Id. at 862.
117.

Id. (quoting and criticizing the majority opinion at 845-47).

118. Id. at 863.
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at stake in the Maryland procedure:
The Court characterizes the State's interest which "outweigh[s]" the explicit text of the Constitution as an "interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims," ante,
at 853, an "interest in protecting" such victims "from the emotional
trauma of testifying," ante, at 855. That is not so. A child who
meets the Maryland statute's requirement of suffering such "serious
emotional distress" from confrontation that he "cannot reasonably
communicate" would seem entirely safe. Why would a prosecutor
want to call a witness who cannot reasonably communicate? And if
he did, it would be the State's own fault. Protection of the child's
interest-as far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned-is entirely
within Maryland's control. The State's interest here is in fact no
more and no less than what the State's interest always is when it
seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal proceedings:
more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an unworthy
interest, but it should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one.
And the interest on the other side is also what it usually is
when the State seeks to get a new class of evidence admitted: fewer
convictions of innocent defendants-specifically, in the present context, innocent defendants accused of particularly heinous crimes. The
"special" reasons that exist for suspending one of the usual guarantees of reliability in the case of children's testimony are perhaps
matched by "special" reasons for being particularly insistent upon it
in the case of children's testimony. Some studies show that children
are substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and
often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from
reality. 119
The dissent concluded by stating that "[t]he Court today has applied
'interest balancing' analysis where the text of the Constitution simply
does not permit it. We are not free to conduct a cost-benefit analysis
of clear and explicit constitutional guarantees, and then to adjust their
meaning to comport with our findings."'' The dissent's criticisms of
the Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig set the stage for the law
and economics analysis of the Maryland procedure and the Court's
analysis thereof."2

119. Id. at 867-68.
120. Id. at 870.
121. What is interesting about the dissent's opinion, is that even though the dissent rather
persuasively makes these arguments, and effectively undercuts the rationale of the Court's
opinion, the dissent contains some language which arguably indicates that it is bothered more
by the Court's rationale and procedural approach than it is by the Court's conclusion:
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V. A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE MARYLAND
PROCEDURE AND OF THE COURT'S OPINION IN MARYLAND V. CRAIG
As the dissent in Maryland v. Craig notes, the Supreme Court

employed a cost-benefit approach in analyzing the right to face-toface confrontation;' 22 a cost-benefit approach which resembles a law
and economics approach. The Court's analysis compared the relative
costs and benefits of the right to face-to-face confrontation to those of
the Maryland procedure."z The Court noted that the principal benefit of the right to face-to-face confrontation is that it increases the
reliability of the evidence, 24 i.e., that it minimizes the expected cost
It is not within our charge to speculate that, "where face-to-face confrontation
causes significant emotional distress in a child witness" confrontation might "in
fact disserve the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal." If so, that is a defect
in the Constitution-which should be amended by the procedures provided for such
an eventuality, but cannot be corrected by judicial pronouncement that it is archaic,
contrary to "wide-spread belief' and thus null and void.
Id. at 870 (citation omitted). The dissent's statement that the right to face-to-face confrontation may actually "disserve" the effective enforcement of the child abuse laws is interesting.
The dissent had just finished showing, through a cost-benefit analysis, how important face-toface confrontation is to minimizing the risk of an erroneous judgment in any given case.
How then could the right to face-to-face confrontation disserve the effective enforcement of
child abuse laws? The answer lies in a macro analysis of the problem. See infra notes 25574 and accompanying text.
122. Craig, 497 U.S. "at 870 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court spends the opening part of
its opinion establishing that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute, but rather
the right is a mere preference subject to a cost-benefit analysis:
We have never held . . . that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at
trial . .

.

. [O]ur precedents establish that "the Confrontation Clause reflects a

preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial," . . . a preference that "must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case."
Id. at 844, 849 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) and Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). The Court's conclusion that the right to face-to-face
confrontation is subject to a cost-benefit analysis is consistent with economic theory.
123. Id. at 850. The Court stated the crux of its analysis as follows:
That the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not absolute does not, of course,
mean that it may easily be dispensed with. As we suggested in Coy, our precedents confirm that a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be
satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of
such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.
Id.(restating the holding in Coy, 487 U.S. at 1025).
Restated in more economic terms, face-to-face confrontation may be denied if there
are benefits from dispensing with the right, and the costs inherent in the increased risk of an
erroneous conviction are minimized by measures which otherwise assure the reliability of the
evidence.
124. The Court began its opinion by pronouncing that: "The central concern of the Con-
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of error by reducing the risk of an erroneous judgment. In the case
before the Court, however, this benefit comes at a rather steep price:

trauma to the witness." The Court then implicitly posed the question of whether face-to-face confrontation was the most efficient
means of insuring the reliability of the evidence in such cases.'26
The Court minimized the benefits of face-to-face confrontation by: (1)
characterizing it as simply one of several elements of the Confrontation Clause; 27 and (2) analogizing to the hearsay exceptions and
claiming that the evidence admitted under the Maryland procedure
was at least as reliable as the evidence admitted under the hearsay
exceptions.'
On the other hand, the Court maximized the direct
cost associated with face-to-face confrontation (and thus the savings

under the Maryland procedure) by emphasizing the trauma the witness
would experience. 29 The Court implicitly reasoned that just as the

costs of face-to-face confrontation exceed the benefits in the case of
the hearsay exceptions, any decrease in the reliability of the evidence
under the Maryland procedure was more than offset by the benefit of
not subjecting the witness to the trauma of testifying face-to-face
against the defendant.' Since the net benefit of the Maryland procedure exceeded the net benefit of the right to face-to-face confrontation, there is a compelling state interest (furthering Pareto optimality)

which justifies denying the defendant the right to face-to-face con-

frontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of
fact." Id. at 845. Although this statement is true, it arguably does not go far enough. First,
why is the central concern "to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant?" From an economic perspective, the answer is obvious: to minimize the expected cost
of error associated with the criminal justice system, and in particular to minimize the risk of
an erroneous conviction. But more importantly, from a societal perspective, the objective is to
ensure the reliability of the evidence at a cost which produces a net benefit to society. The
key is the sum of the expected cost of the rule ensuring the reliability of the evidence and
the expected cost of error under the rule, not just the latter. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Although this point appears rather minor, it is a harbinger of the Court's
analysis to come.
125. Craig, 497 U.S. at 842.
126. Id. at 850; see supra note 3.
127. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-47.
128. Id. at 851 (concerning reliability, the Court claimed that the methods used by the
Maryland statute to insure the reliability of the evidence were "far greater than those required
for admission of hearsay testimony under the Confrontation Clause") (citing Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
129. Id. at 853-55.
130. Id. at 852-53.
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frontation. t3'
Despite the apparent logic of the Court's analysis and its apparent consistency with a law and economics analysis,' the Court's
analysis of the issue is too superficial and too conclusory. The Court
never really performed a thorough economic analysis of the Maryland
procedure. Instead, the Court focused too much on the trauma to the
witness from face-to-face confrontation and simply presumed that the
Maryland procedure is more efficient than face-to-face confrontation.

A more thorough economic analysis of both the Maryland procedure
and the Court's opinion reveals the flaws in the Court's analysis.
A.

An Economic Analysis of the Maryland Procedure

An economic analysis of a procedural rule should focus on
whether adopting the rule produces a net social benefit: whether the
sum of the expected cost of error with the rule plus the expected
direct cost of the rule is less than the expected cost of error without
the rule.' When this principle is applied to the Maryland procedure, the issue becomes whether the sum of the expected cost of

131. Id.
132. The Court's cost-benefit analysis has a certain economic ring to it and at first
glance appears consistent with an economic analysis. Under an economic analysis of a procedural rule, the goal is to minimize the sum of the expected cost of error and the expected
cost of the procedural rules. Although the Court does not use this terminology, the Court's
focus on maximizing the reliability of the evidence can be equated with the economic goal
of minimizing the expected cost of error. The key to the expected cost of error is the risk of
an erroneous decision, which in turn depends upon the reliability of the evidence. Thus, in
comparing the reliability of the evidence under the Maryland procedure versus the right to
face-to-face confrontation, the Court is implicitly comparing the respective expected costs of
error. Inasmuch as the Maryland procedure has only three out of the possible four elements
of confrontation, the Court's implicit finding that the Maryland procedure has a higher expected cost of error is what one would expect if employing an economic analysis. Moreover,
the Court's implicit finding that the right to face-to-face confrontation, with its trauma to the
victim, has higher direct cost than the Maryland procedure also appears consistent with an
economic analysis. The issue then was whether the savings from the procedures reduced
expected direct costs exceed its increase in the expected cost of error. If so, the Maryland
procedure would produce a net benefit and should be adopted; if not (if the increase in the
expected cost of error exceeds the decrease in the direct costs), the Maryland procedure
should be rejected. Inasmuch as no absolute or definitive values can be assigned to the variables in question, the Court's qualitative conclusion that the savings from the procedure's
reduced direct costs exceed its increase in the expected cost of error appears defensible. Accordingly, the Court's cost-benefit analysis in Maryland v. Craig can be rephrased as, and
appears consistent with, a rudimentary economic analysis of the issue. But a more detailed
and thorough economic analysis of the Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig reveals its
superficial analysis of the issue.
133. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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error with the Maryland procedure ("CE w/ MP"), plus the expected
direct cost of the Maryland procedure ("C of MP"), is less than the
expected cost of error in the absence of the Maryland procedure ("CE
w/out MP"):
(CE w/ MP) + (C of MP) vs. (CE w/out MP).
Inasmuch as the Maryland procedure is an alternative procedure to
face-to-face confrontation, the right side of the formula, the expected
cost of error without the Maryland procedure is the total expected
cost of face-to-face confrontation:

(CE w/ FTFC) + (C of FTFC).
The question then is how the sum of the expected cost of error under
the Maryland procedure, plus the expected direct cost of the Maryland
procedure, compares to the sum of the expected cost of error under
face-to-face confrontation, plus the direct cost of face-to-face confrontation: "
(CE w/ MP) + (C of MP) vs. (CE w/ FTFC) + (C of FTFC).
The problem with stating the issue in this way, however, is that
the comparison of the total cost of the Maryland procedure versus the
total cost of face-to-face confrontation requires a comparison of apples and oranges. Definitive numbers cannot be assigned to any of
the critical variables on either side of the formula. Any comparison of
the net benefit of the Maryland procedure versus the net benefit of
the right to face-to-face confrontation is difficult, if not impossible, to
perform. Accordingly, the law and economics analysis of a procedural
rule typically is an all or nothing analysis: what is the total cost with
the procedural rule versus the total cost without the procedural
rule.' The best way (and arguably the only valid way) to perform
the analysis is thus to compare the net benefit of the right to face-toface confrontation without the Maryland procedure versus the net

134. Since the Maryland procedure will be employed only after a hearing where the
court determines that the witness would experience undue emotional distress if required to
testify face-to-face, the direct cost of such confrontation is an individualized direct cost, not
an expected direct cost. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56.
135. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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benefit of the right to face-to-face confrontation with the Maryland
procedure. In essence, the question then becomes how the Maryland

procedure affects the variables in the formula which calculates the
total cost of error with the right to face-to-face confrontation:
TC w/FTFC =
(C of EC) x (P of EC) + (C of EA) x (P of EA) + C of FTFC.
VS.
TC w/ FTFC-MP =
(C of EC) x (P of EC) + (C of EA) x (P of EA) + C of FTFC-MP.

While these formulas look daunting, the analysis simplifies itself
rather quickly when each variable is compared to itself across the two
possible scenarios. Since absolute values cannot be assigned to any of
the variables, the key is how the magnitude of each variable under
face-to-face confrontation is affected by the Maryland procedure.'36
1. How the Maryland Procedure Affects the Expected
Costs of an Erroneous Judgment
The expected cost of error is the cost of an erroneous judgment

times the probability of an erroneous judgment, which can be broken
down further into the cost of an erroneous conviction times the probability of an erroneous conviction, plus the cost of an erroneous acquittal times the probability of an erroneous acquittal.'37 Neither the
cost of an erroneous conviction nor the cost of an erroneous acquittal
is affected by the adoption of the Maryland procedure:' 38

136. Inasmuch as the essence of the Maryland procedure is the absence of the right to
face-to-face confrontation, much of the economic analysis of the Maryland procedure is the
exact converse of the economic analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation (and hence
should be consistent with the economic analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation).
Just as face-to-face confrontation decreases the total cost of error by decreasing the probability of an erroneous conviction, under the Maryland procedure, with no face-to-face confrontation, one would expect the total cost of error to increase because of the increased probability
of an erroneous conviction. In light of the well recognized potential for emotional distress
costs to the witness under face-to-face confrontation, under the Maryland procedure, with no
face-to-face confrontation, one would expect a savings in the direct costs to the witness.
Thus, the key is whether the savings derived from eliminating face-to-face confrontation exceed the increased costs which stem from the increase in the probability of an erroneous
conviction. This is the crux of the economic analysis of the Maryland procedure, and the
Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig can easily be recast along these economic lines.
137. See supra part III.B.I.
138. The cost of an erroneous conviction is the same under both the total cost of error
with the right to face-to-face confrontation and under the Maryland procedure. Likewise, the
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(C of EC) w/ FTFC = (C of EC) -v/ FTFC-MP;
(C of EA) w/ FTFC = (C of EA) w/ FTFC-MP.
The respective costs of an erroneous decision depend upon factors
which are not affected by the presence or absence of the Maryland
procedure. 3 9 In addition, the presence or absence of the Maryland
procedure does not affect the principle established above that the cost
of an erroneous conviction exceeds the cost of an erroneous
acquittal:CCA
(C of EC) w/ FTFC > (C of EA) w/ FTFC;
(C2 of EQ) w/F1TFC-MP > (C of EA) w/ FTFC-MP.
Although the Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig is devoid of
any express mention of the costs of an erroneous conviction or the
costs of an erroneous acquittal, since these variables are not affected
by the adoption of the Maryland procedure, the Court's failure to
analyze these variables is not fatal to the Court's economic analysis
of the Maryland procedure.' 4' Moreover, the Court's analysis focused in part on the reliability of the evidence 42 (i.e., the risk of an
erroneous conviction), no doubt in implicit recognition of the fact that
the cost of an erroneous conviction is greater than the cost of an
erroneous acquittal.

cost of an erroneous acquittal is the same in both of the respective formulas.
139. The impact of an erroneous decision upon the net punishment involves costs which
are not affected by the absence or presence of the Maryland procedure. The additional costs
inherent in an erroneous conviction (the social stigma, potential lost employment, loss of freedom and the costs society incurs in incarcerating the individual) are likewise not affected by
the absence or presence of the procedure. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
140. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 553; see also supra notes 60-66 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, the analysis of the net benefit of face-to-face confrontation versus the net
benefit of the Maryland procedure will depend on the relative values assigned to: (1) the
probability of an erroneous conviction in each formula; (2) the probability of an erroneous
acquittal in each formula; and (3) the direct costs of the respective procedural rules. Although
the Court focuses on these three variables, the Court's analysis of each of the variables arguably is incomplete.
141. The omission does, however, facilitate the Court's attempt to minimize the increase
in expected cost of error under the Maryland procedure.
142. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-47, 851.
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2.

How the Maryland Procedure Affects the Probabilities of an
Erroneous Judgment
In light of the fact that the Maryland procedure does not affect
the respective costs of an erroneous conviction and an erroneous
acquittal, the expected cost of error under the Maryland procedure
will depend upon how the Maryland procedure affects the probability
of an erroneous conviction and the probability of an erroneous acquittal.
The essence of the Maryland procedure is the absence of face-toface confrontation. Face-to-face confrontation has repeatedly been
trumpeted as one of the most important procedural rules in the battle
to minimize the risk of an erroneous conviction. Face-to-face confrontation deters witnesses from lying and facilitates the trier of fact in
detecting when a witness is lying.'43 Arguably, it is self-evident that
eliminating the right would produce an increase in the probability of
an erroneous conviction and thus an increase in the total cost of
error:
(P of EC) w/ FIFC < (P of EC) w/ FTFC-MP.
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig
never expressly acknowledges that the Maryland procedure will increase the probability of an erroneous conviction, the Court implicitly
recognized this fact. The Court expressly acknowledged the important
role face-to-face confrontation plays in minimizing the probability of
an erroneous conviction:
[F]ace-to-face confrontation enhances the accuracy of factfinding by
reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person ...... "[I]t may confound and undo the false accuser, or
reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult."
.. . [F]ace-to-face confrontation forms "the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause." 1"
The Court's opening comments concerning face-to-face confrontation
implicitly reflect, and are consistent with, the traditional view that
face-to-face confrontation reduces the risk of an erroneous conviction. 4 ' Accordingly, despite the Court's emphasis on the other ele-

143. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also supra note 53.
144. Craig, 497 U.S. at 846-47 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 140, 157 (1970)).
145. Id. at 845. ("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reli-
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ments of the Confrontation Clause which are present under the Maryland procedure, the absence of the right to face-to-face confrontation
must be deemed to increase the probability of an erroneous conviction. Otherwise, there would be no point in requiring that there be an
important state interest to be furthered. If the Maryland procedure
truly had no effect upon the probability of an erroneous conviction,
the procedure's reduced direct cost to the witness in terms of anxiety
and potential trauma would argue for its adoption across the board in
all cases.
In addition, the Court noted that the principal function of the
defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation is to insure the reliability of the evidence.'4 6 In analyzing the reliability of the evidence under the Maryland procedure, however, the Court never claimed that
the evidence would be as reliable as with the right to face-to-face
confrontation, but only that the evidence would be adequately reliable.'47 The Court's implicit recognition that the adoption of the
Maryland procedure will increase the probability of an erroneous
conviction, which in turn will increase the expected cost of error, is
consistent with an economic analysis of the Maryland procedure.
While adopting the Maryland procedure will increase the probability of an erroneous conviction, adopting the Maryland procedure
will decrease the probability of an erroneous acquittal:
(P of EA) w/ FTFC > (P of EA) w/ FTFC-MP.
As noted above, inherent in the right to face-to-face confrontation is
the risk that the trier of fact may misinterpret a witness's apparent
reluctance to testify face-to-face against the defendant as evidence that
the witness is lying. 4 ' Eliminating the right to face-to-face confrontation and substituting the Maryland procedure will reduce this risk
and thus lower the probability of an erroneous acquittal.'49
ability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.").
146. Id.
147. "[T]he presence of these other elements of confrontation-oath, cross-examination,
and observation of the witness' demeanor-adequately ensures that the testimony is both
reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing . . .." Id. at 851.
148. Face-to-face confrontation may produce nervousness, anxiety and even trauma to
truthful witnesses. Such nervousness, anxiety and trauma may be misinterpreted by the finder
of fact as evidence that the truthful witness is lying. See supra note 72 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, the right to face-to-face confrontation runs a higher risk of erroneous acquittal than does the Maryland procedure.
149. The reduction in the risk of an erroneous acquittal produces a net savings to society
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Although the Court's opinion is completely devoid of any mention of the fact that eliminating face-to-face confrontation will reduce

the probability of an erroneous acquittal, 5 ' this omission is not fatal
to the Court's economic analysis of the Maryland procedure. Since

the cost of an erroneous conviction is greater than the cost of an
erroneous acquittal, the critical variable is the change in the probability of an erroneous conviction. Even if the decrease in the probability
of an erroneous acquittal matched the increase in the probability of an
erroneous conviction, the total cost of error would still increase under

the Maryland procedure due to the greater costs associated with an
erroneous conviction.' 5'
Thus, the Court's analysis of the total cost of error under the
Maryland procedure is generally consistent with the economic analy-

sis. The Court implicitly recognizes that the Maryland procedure will
increase the probability of an erroneous conviction,' which in turn
will increase the expected cost of error:
(CE w/ MP) > (CE w/ FTFC).
Thus, as the Court properly states: "The critical inquiry . . . is whether use of the procedure is necessary to further an important state
interest."'5 In other words, are there economic benefits to society
which outweigh the acknowledged costs of the Maryland procedure

and therefore justify its use despite the increase in the total cost of
error?

when multiplied by the cost of an erroneous acquittal.
150. The Court makes no reference, either directly or indirectly, to how the Maryland
procedure affects the probability of an erroneous acquittal. Apparently the Court believed that
either the probability of an erroneous acquittal was not relevant to the analysis or that the
Maryland procedure had no significant affect upon the probability of an erroneous acquittal.
151. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. In addition, any benefit derived from the
decrease in the probability of an erroneous acquittal would only reduce the increase in the
expected cost of error from the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction. Inasmuch as the Court underestimated the increase in the expected cost of error from the increase
in the probability of an erroneous conviction, the Court's failure to include the savings from
the decrease in the probability of an erroneous acquittal partially offsets the Court's underestimation.
152. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
153. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990).
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3.

How the Maryland Procedure Affects the Direct Costs of the
Procedural System
As the Court implicitly noted, the principal economic benefit to
society from the Maryland procedure is eliminating the emotional
distress costs to witnesses from face-to-face confrontation. Both the
Court and the traditional economic analysis of the right to face-toface confrontation recognize that face-to-face confrontation may impose direct costs on the witness in terms of the emotional distress the
witness may suffer.' As the Court put it: "[F]ace-to-face presence
may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused
child . .*."'., The Court also cited the "growing body of academic
literature documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child
abuse victims who must testify in court."'5 6 The Court's discussion
of how the Maryland procedure would protect the child from this
emotional distress implicitly reflects the Court's recognition of the
costs of face-to-face confrontation and the savings to be derived from
the Maryland procedure as a result of the absence of face-to-face
confrontation:. 7
(C of FTFC) > (C of MP).
There is little doubt that there are savings associated with the Maryland procedure in terms of the emotional distress costs to the witness.
The critical issue though is whether the magnitude of these expected
savings is greater than the increase in the expected cost of error from
the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction plus the
direct costs of the Maryland procedure:
(C of FTFC) - (C of MP) vs. (CE of MP) - (CE of FTFC).
A procedural rule should be adopted only if it results in a net benefit
to society.' s As applied to the Maryland procedure, it should be
adopted only if the left side of the formula is greater than the right.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See cases cited supra note 3.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 846 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)).
Id. at 855.
See id. at 851-57.
See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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Comparing the Magnitude of the Increase in the Expected
Cost of Error with the Magnitude of the Expected
Savings from Eliminating the Emotional Distress Caused by

Face-to-Face Confrontation
Up until this point, the Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig has
essentially been the converse of the traditional economic analysis of
the right to face-to-face confrontation."59 As an economic analysis of
the issue would predict, the analysis has narrowed itself to whether

the savings derived from eliminating the trauma the witness would
suffer from face-to-face confrontation exceed the increase in the expected cost of error incurred as a result of the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction. The traditional economic analysis of
the right to face-to-face confrontation reasons that the expected cost

of an erroneous conviction is so great, that any increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction significantly increases the expected
cost of error." More importantly, the traditional economic analysis
presumes that the expected direct cost a witness may suffer from
face-to-face confrontation has to be lower than the expected increase
in the cost of error if face-to-face confrontation were eliminated. t6 '
In contrast, in Maryland v. Craig, the Court concluded, at least in
some cases, that the direct cost to the witness from face-to-face confrontation exceeded the increase in the expected cost of error and thus
the adopted Maryland procedure would increase social wealth. 16 2 Is
the Court's conclusion defensible in light of the traditional economic

analysis of face-to-face confrontation?
159. See supra note 137 (with the possible exception of the Court's arguably underestimating the magnitude of the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction which
results from the elimination of the right).
160. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
162. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853. Justice ScaUa, writing in dissent, criticized the Court's
abandonment of the traditional interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia's
argument implicitly reflects the traditional assumption underlying the right to face-to-face
confrontation-that any cost imposed upon the witness is less than the expected cost associated with the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction in the absence of face-toface confrontation:
"That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or
abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser,
or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult." To say that a defendant loses
his right to confront a witness when that would cause the witness not to testify is
rather like saying that the defendant loses his right to counsel when counsel would
save him, or his right to subpoena witnesses when they would exculpate him, or
his right not to give testimony against himself when that would prove him guilty.
Id. at 866-67 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988)).
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There are three differences between the Court's analysis of the
Maryland procedure and the traditional economic analysis of face-to-

face confrontation that may explain the different conclusions reached.
First, quantitatively, while the Court implicitly recognized that the
Maryland procedure would increase the probability of an erroneous

conviction, and thus the total cost of error, the Court went to great
lengths to minimize the magnitude of the increase. The Court emphasized that face-to-face confrontation is only one of four elements that
combine to ensure the reliability of evidence under the Confrontation
Clause. 63 Since the Maryland procedure retains three of the four
elements of the Confrontation Clause, the Court concluded that the

Maryland procedure "permit[s] a defendant to 'confound and undo the
false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent
adult .... [']""6 The Court went so far as to actually claim that the

Maryland procedure might even "aid a defendant in eliciting favorable
testimony from the child witness."'65 The Court is straining to mini-

mize any increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction.
The second difference is that qualitatively the Court analogized
the Maryland procedure to the hearsay exceptions. The Court reasoned that whatever the magnitude of the increase in the expected
cost of error under the Maryland. procedure, inasmuch as hearsay
evidence is admissible, the assurances of evidence reliability are as
great under the Maryland procedure as they are under the hearsay

exceptions. The Court thus concluded that the magnitude of the increase in the expected cost of error under the Maryland procedure is
no greater than under the hearsay exceptions. 66 The Court per163. Id. at 844-46.
164. Id. at 851 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020 (1988)). The Court reasoned that inasmuch as the Maryland procedure preserves three out of the four elements of the confrontation
right, the reliability of the testimony is adequately assured. In so finding, in essence the
Court is stating that the risk of an erroneous decision, and thus the expected cost of error, is
not that different under the Maryland procedure as opposed to the right to face-to-face confrontation.
165. Id. The Court appears to be arguing, somewhat incredulously, that the Maryland
procedure may actually reduce the risk of an erroneous conviction. To the extent the Court's
comment can be construed this way, the comment is difficult to accept. If such were the
case, why should there be even a preference for face-to-face confrontation? Why should the
Maryland procedure not be adopted in all cases, not just in child abuse cases, but in all
cases where the witness may be nervous about testifying face-to-face against the alleged
perpetrator? While there may be isolated situations where the Court's comment may make
sense, it is difficult to accept that on 'average the Maryland procedure reduces the probability
of an erroneous conviction in comparison to the probability of an erroneous conviction under
the right to face-to-face confrontation.
166. Id.. at 851-52. As the dissent points out, the Court's reliance on previous decisions
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formed no real analysis of the magnitude of the increase in the expected cost of error under the Maryland procedure, but instead presumed that the increase must not be that great. 67 In addition, implicit in the Court's analogy to the hearsay exceptions is the conclusion that whatever the increase in the expected cost of error, the

benefits from eliminating the trauma associated with face-to-face
confrontation outweigh that increase.
The third and perhaps the most important difference between the
Court's analysis of the Maryland procedure and the traditional economic analysis of face-to-face confrontation, is that the Maryland
procedure employs an individualized approach to calculating the costs
to the witness from face-to-face confrontation. The traditional eco-

nomic analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation is based upon
a comparison of the expected costs and benefits of the right. 6 The
expected costs and benefits are calculated from a weighted average
approach.' 69 All of the different possible costs and benefits are cal-

holding that the right to face-to-face confrontation does not apply to the hearsay exceptions is
misplaced. From a law and economics perspective, those holdings only stand for the obvious:
that there is no absolute right to face-to-face confrontation. But citing to those holdings only
begs the question: whether the benefits of the right to face-to-face confrontation in this context exceed the costs? While the probability of an erroneous conviction may be the same in
both contexts, the rest of the analysis will depend on the other relevant variables: the probability of an erroneous acquittal and the direct costs of the respective rules. The Court fails to
examine the other variables and simply assumes that the costs and benefits are sufficiently
similar so that the conclusion is the same in both contexts. Id. at 860-70.
167. See id. at 851. The Court spends the majority of the opinion establishing that the
right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute, but rather is a mere preference. It really
does not scrutinize whether the savings of the Maryland procedure exceed the costs associated
with the procedure so as to justify its adoption. Establishing that the right to face-to-face
confrontation is subject to a cost-benefit analysis is different from performing the cost-benefit
analysis. Having established that the right is subject to a cost benefit analysis, which an
economic theory would support, the Court fails to follow through on the analysis. The Court
spends a great deal of time discussing the cost of the trauma a child witness in a child
abuse case may experience, but the Court never really examines the other side of the equation: the increased costs associated with the Maryland procedure. Instead the Court merely
presumes the increased expected costs associated with the Maryland procedure at most equal
the expected cost of error under the exceptions to the hearsay rule, and inasmuch as that
total cost of error is acceptable in the hearsay context, it must be acceptable here. From an
economic perspective, however, there are problems with the Court's presumption. The Court's
blind acceptance of the hearsay exception cost-benefit analysis of the right as not only applicable to, but determinative of, the cost-benefit analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation in the child abuse context is highly questionable. The Court should have performed a
complete analysis of all of the relevant variables.
168. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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culated"'7 Each possible amount is then multiplied by the probability of each occurring."' The sums are then totalled to determine the
weighted expected costs and benefits.' As applied to the costs of
face-to-face confrontation, because the majority of witnesses experience little or no emotional distress from face-to-face confrontation,
the expected cost is relatively low despite the fact that a small number of witnesses may experience trauma from face-to-face confrontation. 73
In contrast, the Maryland procedure rejects the traditional,
weighted average analysis of the expected costs of face-to-face confrontation and instead adopts an individualized approach to calculating
the direct costs. The Maryland procedure does not presume a certain
amount of emotional distress to the witness, but rather requires an
individualized finding by the trial court that the witness would suffer
trauma if required to testify face-to-face against the defendant.
Thus, the magnitude of the cost of face-to-face confrontation is not
the expected cost that a witness may suffer, but rather a potentially
much higher cost-the cost of imposing psychological, and possibly
even physical, trauma to a particular child witness.'75 No doubt this
cost is substantial, substantially higher than the expected cost of faceto-face confrontation.
Just as the Court went to great lengths to minimize the increase
in total costs stemming from the increase in the probability of an
erroneous conviction, the Court went to great lengths to maximize the
costs to the witness from face-to-face confrontation (and thus the
savings under the Maryland procedure).' 76 The Court emphasized the
state's interest in protecting the alleged child abuse victim from the
trauma of testifying face-to-face 7 7 against the alleged perpetra-

170. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

173. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
174. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855-56 (1990).

175. There is always the possibility that the child may not actually suffer the anticipated
trauma if he or she was required to testify face-to-face. But this possibility is rather slim, so
there is no need to discount the Court's finding that the child would experience trauma to
reflect this possibility.
176. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852-54.
177. It is at this point that the significance of the Court's first error becomes more pronounced. See supra note 125. By misstating the central concern of the Confrontation Clause,
the Court failed to perform the appropriate economic analysis of the right to face-to-face
confrontation. Instead of analyzing each of the variables in the cost of error and the direct
cost formula with and without the right to face-to-face confrontation, the Court focused in-
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tor." The Court noted that the savings derived from protecting the
alleged child abuse victim from further embarrassment and trauma are
so great that the savings have outweighed the benefits associated with

stead on the direct cost of the right to face-to-face confrontation. The Court then conducted
its own version of a cost-benefit analysis of the right to face-to-face confrontation, with the
goal being to reduce the direct cost of the right to face-to-face confrontation instead of focusing on the right figure: the total cost to society. In so doing, the Court failed to examine the
benefits of the right to face-to-face confrontation. Instead, the Court seems to reason that
inasmuch as the right to face-to-face confrontation is not required in the hearsay context, the
benefits must be de minimis. Craig, 497 U.S. at 847-50. As the dissent rightly points out,
the State's real interest is not the protection of child abuse victims from the trauma associated with testifying at trial, but rather the effective enforcement of the child abuse laws. Id. at
867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If the benefits of requiring the victims to testify face-to-face
against the defendants exceed the costs, the victims should be required to testify face-to-face
regardless of the trauma inflicted upon the victims. Anything less would be inefficient.
178. Justice Scalia attacked the Court's description of the State's interest. Justice Scalia
persuasively argues that if the State's goal is to minimize the trauma to the child, the most
effective way to achieve this goal is simply not to call the witness.
The State's interest here is in fact no more and no less than what the State's
interest always is when it seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal
proceedings: more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an unworthy interest, but it should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one.
Id, at 867. Justice Scalia then turned his attention to the principal economic concern in the
implementation of the criminal laws: the costs and probabilities of an erroneous conviction.
"And the interest on the other side is also what it usually is when the State seeks to get a
new class of evidence admitted: fewer convictions of innocent defendants-specifically, in the
present context, innocent defendants accused of particularly heinous crimes." Id. at 867-68.
Justice Scalia went on to point out that while the cost of the right to face-to-face confrontation may be unusually high in the context of child abuse cases, the probability of an erroneous conviction is unusually high, because of the susceptibility of children to the power of
suggestion, as are the costs associated with an erroneous conviction. Id. at 868. In so arguing, Justice Scalia again is affirming the traditional assumption with respect to the right to
face-to-face confrontation, that being that no matter the cost of the right, the costs associated
with the risk of an erroneous conviction outweigh the cost. Justice Scalia's treatment of the
Court's attempt to justify the distinction for child abuse victims is interesting because it
rightly exposes the weakness of the Court's opinion while at the same time exposing the
weakness of its own analysis. What neither the Court nor the dissent addressed, or even
raised, is whether there is something unique about the crime of child abuse which warrants
distinguishing child abuse cases from other crimes for purposes of the right to face-to-face
confrontation, If the State's true interest is simply the effective enforcement of its criminal
statutes, is there something about the State's ability to effectively enforce its child abuse
statutes which warrants distinguishing child abuse cases from other criminal cases for purposes of the right to face-to-face confrontation? Although the Court attempted to distinguish
child abuse cases on the basis of the State's interest in protecting the victim's welfare from
the trauma of having to testify face-to-face against the defendant, that argument is rife with
weaknesses and problems. A more defensible basis for distinguishing child abuse cases is one
that focuses on the real problem underlying Maryland v. Craig: the effective enforcement of
child abuse statutes because of the problem of the reluctant complainants. See infra notes
239-60 and accompanying text.
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other rights.'79 The Court acknowledged the "growing body of academic literature documenting the psychological trauma suffered by
child abuse victims who must testify in court . . . ."' Accordingly,
the Court stated that it "[would] not second-guess the considered
judgment of the Maryland Legislature" that where the child would
suffer trauma, the savings derived from eliminating face-to-face confrontation are substantial. 18 1 In contrast to the traditional economic
analysis of face-to-face confrontation, the Court minimized the increase in the total cost of error from eliminating face-to-face confrontation and maximized the savings associated with eliminating face-toface confrontation.8 2
Returning then to the economic analysis of the Maryland procedure, the issue had narrowed itself to which figure was greater: the
increase in the total cost of error, or the savings from eliminating
face-to-face confrontation. In light of the fact that no absolute numbers are assigned to any of the variables, in the end the question of
which is greater is both a quantitative and qualitative judgment call
based on the best possible 'order of magnitude' analysis of the relevant variables. Quantitatively, the Court minimized the increase in the
total cost of error and maximized the costs to the witness from faceto-face confrontation, requiring an individualized finding of trauma. 83 But even then the question of which cost is greater is a close
call. Qualitatively, the Court analogized the situation to the hearsay
exceptions: the cost of face-to-face confrontation in such situations is
exceedingly high, arguably higher than the increase in the total cost
of error from the absence of face-to-face confrontation."84 In resolving the question, the Court cited the fact that a significant majority of
states had enacted similar statutes to protect child abuse witnesses
from the trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases as evidence
of the widespread belief that the costs of the trauma to the child must
exceed the increase in the total cost of error. 85 At first, this argument would appear to be consistent with an economic analysis of the
question. An economic approach would assume that states are rational
actors and would not adopt a statutory approach which would result

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
Id. at 851-53.
Id. at 836. 854.
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in a net loss to society, thereby decreasing social wealth. Accordingly,
the Court's conclusion that the net benefit of the Maryland procedure
exceeds its net costs, and that the net gain justifies its adoption and
the elimination of face-to-face confrontation (where there is an individualized finding that the witness would experience trauma and the
reliability of the evidence is otherwise insured), appears defensible
both theoretically and practically.'86
Upon closer scrutiny, however, there are problems with all three
critical points in the Court's economic analysis of the issue. Although
the Court's cost-benefit analysis parallels an economic analysis, the
Court: (1) underestimated the magnitude of the increase in the total
cost of error from the increase in the probability of an erroneous
conviction; 87 (2) mistakenly assumed that the reliability of the evidence under the Maryland procedure equalled or surpassed the reliability of the evidence under the hearsay exceptions; (3) miscalculated
the magnitude of the savings under the Maryland procedure by overestimating the direct costs of face-to-face confrontation; and (4) failed
to include the direct costs of the Maryland procedure in its analysis.
B.

Criticisms of the Court's Economic Analysis of the
Maryland Procedure

1. The Court Underestimated the Increase in the Probability of
an Erroneous Conviction
The Court's strained attempt to minimize the importance of faceto-face confrontation and the magnitude of the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction as a result of the elimination of
face-to-face confrontation is highly questionable. The crux of the
Court's effort to minimize the importance of face-to-face confrontation was to portray face-to-face confrontation as simply one of four
elements of the Confrontation Clause. 8 As a purely statistical matter, however, eliminating one-fourth of the confrontation right arguably would significantly increase the probability of an erroneous conviction.9 Moreover, the element eliminated, face-to-face confronta186. Id. at 857.
187. There is no doubt that the elimination of the right to face-to-face confrontation increases the probability of an erroneous conviction, and there is no doubt that the cost of an

erroneous conviction is a major cost warranting serious attention. Yet the Court's cost-benefit
analysis is surprisingly devoid of any serious examination of the increased costs from the in-

crease in the probability of an erroneous conviction.
188. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
189. If there is no requirement of face-to-face confrontation in child abuse cases, the risk
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tion, arguably plays a more important role than the other elements in
minimizing the risk of an erroneous conviction. 90 The Court itself
had characterized the right to face-to-face confrontation as "the core"
of the Confrontation Clause.'9 How can the Court eliminate the

core element and then imply that any increase in the probability of an
erroneous conviction is minimal? There is ample reason to assume
that eliminating face-to-face confrontation would significantly increase
the probability of an erroneous conviction. The Court's failure to address the cost of an erroneous conviction, coupled with the Court's
underestimating the magnitude of the increase in the probability of an
erroneous conviction, results in the Court underestimating the magnitude of the increase in the" total cost of error under the Maryland
procedure. 92

2. The Evidence Admitted Under the Maryland Procedure is
Not as Reliable as the Evidence
Hearsay Exceptions

Admitted Under the

The Court's claim that any increase in the probability of an
erroneous conviction, and thus the expected cost of error, must be
limited because the evidence admitted under the Maryland procedure
is just as reliable as evidence admitted under the hearsay exceptions,
does not hold up under closer scrutiny. 93 Evidence is admitted unthat an innocent defendant may be erroneously convicted increases. As the dissent points out,
this increased risk is greater in child abuse cases than in other cases because of the nature of
the offense. Craig, 497 U.S. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting). First, child abuse charges are
highly factual investigations where the bulk of the testimony is usually circumstantial. Usually
the only direct evidence against the defendant is the child's testimony. Moreover, "[slome
studies show that children are substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and
often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from reality." Id. In addition,
despite the presumption of innocence, the heinous nature of the offense has led some to
question whether defendants in child abuse cases really are presumed innocent. These studies
support the argument that the probability of erroneous testimony, and hence an erroneous
conviction, are higher from child abuse cases than for other types of crimes. Second, the cost
of an erroneous conviction is high. In addition to the stigma which accompanies the conviction, the punishment for the crime of child abuse has been increased in most states. The
increased risk of an erroneous conviction coupled with the high cost of an erroneous conviction would produce a substantial increase in the expected cost of error if face-to-face confrontation were eliminated.
190. "[Tihe defendant's constitutional right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against
him' means, always and everywhere, at least what it explicitly says: 'the right to meet face
to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial."' Id. at 862 (emphasis added)
(Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
191. Green, 399 U.S. at 157.
192. This miscalculation, however, is offset somewhat by the Court's failure to consider
the decrease in the probability of an erroneous acquittal.
193. Instead of examining the benefits of the right to face-to-face confrontation, the Court
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der the hearsay exceptions under the principles of reliability and necessity."' The reliability principle, the primary justification for admitting hearsay evidence,' postulates that the evidence is reliable
because the special circumstances under which the hearsay statement

was made guarantee its trustworthiness and thus vest it with inherent
indicia of reliability.'96 The inherent reliability of the statement
moots the need for confrontation and cross-examination.97 There
are, however, no such special circumstances surrounding a child's
statements regarding child abuse which would inherently insure its
reliability. In fact, the trustworthiness of a child's statements is inherently questionable.'9 8 As Justice Scalia argued rather persuasively in

simply stated that inasmuch as the right to face-to-face confrontation is dispensable in the
hearsay exceptions context, if the cost of the right is great enough it must be expendable in
the child abuse context. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 850-54.
194. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 338 (1977); 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974);
see also Jason A. Levine, The Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Statements by Child Victims
of Sexual Abuse: White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
1040, 1045-46 (1992); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 908 (1992).
195. See Seigel, supra note 194, at 908; Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75
CAL, L. REV. 495, 497 (1987) (stating that "It]he essential premise of [the hearsay] debate is
that reliability is the principal focus of the hearsay rule"); Irving Younger, Reflections on the
Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C. L. REV. 281, 282, 285 (1980); Louis Kaplan, The Theoretical
Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1786, 1794, 1799 (1980) (stating that
"necessity is addressed far less frequently in specific analyses of exceptions").
196. These "special circumstances" denote the "guarantees of trustworthiness" clearly
called for by the Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). See FED. R. EvlD.
803(24) ("A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness.
...); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)
(same); VAUGHN C. BALL ET AL., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 245, at 584 (E. Cleary, 2d ed. 1972); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5 at
800[01],
at 800-11; WIGMORE, supra note 194, at §§ 1420-22; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 298-99 (1973); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388,
397 (5th Cir. 1961); LEhiPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 194, at 365 (pointing out that admissions are "the only exception[s] which admit[] statements that do not in theory carry some
special guarantee of reliability"). See generally Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against
Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1944); Charles T.
McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930); Edmund M. Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 179
(1948); Laurence H. Tribe, Trianguldting Hearsay, Comment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
197. See WIGMORE, supra note 194, at § 1420; see also State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197,
206 (Wash. 1984) (finding that admission of hearsay statements by the lower court was erroneous because the "time, content, and circumstances of the statements offered . . . do not
bear adequate indicia of reliability sufficient to make cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation superfluous").
198. See Lisa R. Askowitz, Restricting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: Pennsylvania Takes It to the Extreme, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201,
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dissent:
The "special" reasons that exist for suspending one of the usual
guarantees of reliability in the case of children's testimony are perhaps matched by "special" reasons for being particularly insistent
upon it in the case of children's testimony. Some studies show that
children are substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults,
and often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from
reality."9
An examination of the Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig reveals
that the Court never claimed that a child's testimony is inherently
reliable, thus implicitly acknowledging that the testimony fails to bear
the traditionally required "indicia of reliability." 2"
The Court's claim that the evidence admitted under the Maryland
procedure is just as reliable as the testimony admitted under the hearsay exceptions is based upon the fact that the other elements of the
Confrontation Clause are still present under the Maryland procedure,
thereby insuring the reliability of the evidence through the confrontation elements which still remain:

202 n.9 (1993) ("[Jiurors may interpret a child's apparent confusion, hesitancy, and inconsistency as indicative of unreliability."); Lucy Berliner & Mary K. Barbieri, The Testimony of
the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 125, 126-27 (1984) (describing the
reluctance of prosecutors to call child witnesses who may not perform adequately as a witness); Nancy Thoennes & Jessica Pearson, Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegation Project, in NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY AND CONCILIATION COURTS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES: A RESOURCE BOOK FOR
JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL 8 (1988) ("Experts in the field believe that children's statements should be taken seriously, but they acknowledge . . . children fabricate stories of sexual abuse to please adults, to take revenge against one of their parents, or simply to get attention."); Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex
Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1983) (noting that "[e]ven when the child
does appear in court and testifies, he or she is often met with skepticism and disbelief," and
explaining that this reaction is due to society's belief that children tend to fantasize and tell
stories which would undermine any inherent reliability); see also Wilson v. United States, 271
F.2d 492, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("It is well recognized that children are more highly suggestible than adults. Sexual activity, with the aura of mystery that adults create about it,
confuses and fascinates them. Moreover they have, of course, no real understanding of the
serious consequences of the charges they make .. .") (quoting MANFRED S. GUTrMACHER
& HENRI WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY & THE LAw 374 (1952)). But see Gail S. Goodman &
Alison Clarke-Stewart, Suggestibility in Children's Testimony: Implications for Sexual Abuse
Investigations, in THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS 92, 103 (John Doris
ed., 1991); Yun, supra, at 1751 (acknowledging schools of thought which contend child witnesses will not lie about incidents of sexual abuse).
199. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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Although we are mindful of the many subtle effects face-to-face
confrontation may have on an adversary criminal proceeding, the

presence of these other elements of confrontation-oath, cross-examination, and observation of the witness' demeanor-adequately
ensures that the testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous
adversarial testing in the manner functionally equivalent to that
accorded live, in-person testimony."0 '
The problem is that these "other elements of confrontation" are not
well suited for insuring the reliability of the evidence in question.
The reliability of a hearsay statement is said to depend upon the
declarant's four testimonial capacities: sincerity, narration, memory
and perception. °- Of these four, most advocates of hearsay exceptions emphasize the sincerity capacity.0 3 The different elements of
confrontation test the different capacities which affect the reliability of
the evidence." 4 Cross-examination effectively exposes defects in, the
declarant's narration, memory, and perception capacities, but it is not
well suited to exposing defects in the declarant's sincerity:

201. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851.
202. See Kaplan, supra note 195, at 1796; Morgan, supra note 196, at 218; Tribe, supra
note 196, at 958; see also Moss v. Ole South Real Estate, 933 F.2d 1300, 1308 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 441 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 119 (9th Cir. 1979).
203. See Kaplan, supra note 195. at 1797; see also Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Importance of the Memory Factor in Analyzing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson
Slowtvl Learnt-And Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L. REv. 215, 219-22 (1989) (describing assumptions of common law courts about the relative importance of sincerity and memory in
formulating hearsay exceptions). For examples of arguments that emphasize sincerity, see Jefferson, supra note 196, at 8; Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances
Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236-37 (1922); Kathryn E. Wohlsen, Comment,
The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence
803(1), 81 DICK. L. REV. 347, 353 (1976); FED R. EvID. 803(1), (2), (4), 804(b)(3) advisory
committee's notes.
204. See Normand M. Garland, An Overview of Relevance and Hearsay: A Nine Step
Analytical Guide, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 1039, 1062-63 (1993) ("[The hearsay rule . . . [is]
based on this rationale: Out-of-court statements are of suspect trustworthiness .. because the
declarant was not under oath at the time the statement was made, and the declarant's perception . . . [is] not subject to cross-examination."); Michael H. Graham, Application of the
Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 353, 375 ("[C]ross-examination enables the adverse party
to . . . explore the perception . . . and narration of the witness."); Marilyn J. Maag, Case
Note, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1984) ("[E]xclusion of hearsay evidence stems from
the belief that cross-examination is the best way to detect inaccuracies in the witness's perception, memory and narration of an event. Furthermore, when the witness appears in court,
the testimony is given under oath and the witness's demeanor is observable.").
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Few would doubt that cross-examination effectively remedies defects

in the other three capacities: it exposes and resolves ambiguity, it
tests or refreshes memory, and it brings into question possible de-

fects in perception. By contrast, cross-examination may be less well
suited to exposing insincerity.'
The other elements of the Confrontation Clause-oath, observation of
demeanor by the trier of fact, and face-to-face physical presence-are
better suited to testing and insuring the sincerity of the witness." 6

Of these three elements, however, face-to-face physical presence,
is best suited to testing and insuring the sincerity of the declarant. 7
Although the jury's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness is important, it is the declarant's demeanor when required to
testify face-to-face against the defendant that is critical to testing and
insuring the truthfulness of the testimony: "[Fjace-to-face confrontation enhances the accuracy of factfinding by reducing the risk that a
witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person

. .

. 'It is al-

ways more difficult to tell a lie about a person "to his face" than
"behind his back."' ' 20 8 The particular risk with a child's testimony
is its truthfulness.2" The particular element of confrontation best
suited to test and insure the reliability of this capacity is face-to-face
physical presence. The absence of face-to-face confrontation greatly
reduces the reliability of the evidence.
The Court's argument appears to be that since face-to-face physi-

205. Kaplan, supra note 195, at 1798; see also Morgan, supra note 196, at 188 (demonstrating that cross-examination's "most important service is in exposing faults in perception
and memory").
206. See Sheryl K. Peterson, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813, 814 n.4 (1983) ("[O]ther reasons that have been advanced
in support of the hearsay rule are that [face-to-face confrontation] allows the jury to observe
the [witness's] demeanor as an aid in evaluating the witness's sincerity and that a witness is
less likely to lie when under oath"); see also BALL ET AL., supra note 196, § 245.
207. Both oath and demeanor have been discredited as reliable guarantors
of the
witness's sincerity. See Massaro, supra note 11, at 899 ("[Ain oath will impress on a witness
the need to tell the truth only if that witness respects the oath or fears punishment for perjury. If the witness is unmoved by the oath or the consequences of lying to the court, then the
oath is an empty ritual."); see also SOLOMON E. AsCH, SOCtAL PSYCHOLOGY 195-203 (1952);
PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LiEs 162 (1985) (offering evidence that people generally do no better
at detecting whether someone is lying than they would if they chose randomly).
208. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (quoting Coy v Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1019 (1988)); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980) ("[T]he requirement of
personal presence . . .undoubtedly makes it more difficult to lie against someone, particularly if that person is an accused and present at trial:') (quoting 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
800[01], at 800-10 (1991)).
209. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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cal presence is expendable in the hearsay exceptions, as are all the
other confrontation elements, the evidence admitted under the Maryland procedure must be more reliable by definition since at least
some of the elements of confrontation are present. The problem with
the Court's argument is that the Court assumes that the evidence must
be more reliable without really analyzing the reliability of the evidence. First, evidence admitted under the hearsay exceptions is evidence which has external guarantees of trustworthiness which give it
inherent indicia of reliability.2 1 There is no evidence that the child's
testimony of abuse has such inherent indicia of reliability, and the
Court never claims that it does.
But more importantly, the real concern underlying the hearsay
doctrine is not the absolute reliability of the evidence in a vacuum,
but rather the risk that a jury might incorrectly assess the reliability,
that is, the credibility, of the evidence in question.2 ' If the evidence
is of low reliability, but the jury would properly assess the low credibility of the evidence and properly discount it, admitting the evidence
in question would not increase the risk of an erroneous conviction
and actually would increase the probability of a correct decision."
On the other hand, if the jury were to overassess the credibility of
the evidence, admitting the evidence would greatly increase the risk
of an erroneous decision. If there is a risk that the jury may
overassess the credibility of the evidence, the evidence should be
excluded. 2 3 Accordingly, the key is not the absolute reliability of
the evidence, but rather the jury's ability to assess accurately the
credibility of the evidence. With the hearsay exceptions, common
sense and experience establish the inherent indicia of reliability which
provide adequate guidance to the jury so that the jury can properly
assess the weight to accord the evidence. In addition, the obvious fact
that the declarant is not before the jury will mean that the jury will
automatically discount the credibility of the hearsay statement to some
degree. It is this combination of factors which insures that the jury's
assessment of the hearsay evidence is "reliable" in the sense that the
jury will accord it the proper weight.

210. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990); Boujaily v. United States, 483

U,S. 171, 200 (1987). (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1979).
211. See Kaplan,
credibility of a piece
the evidence and the
212. See Kaplan,
213. See id.

supra note 195, at 1788 ("When the jury cannot accurately assess the
of evidence, the error results in a gap between the jury's perception of
absolute reliability of the evidence.").
supra note 195, at 1788.
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In contrast, under the Maryland procedure, there is a much greater risk that the jury will overassess the credibility of the child's testimony. 2"4 The nature of the testimony is potentially very prejudicial." 5 The effect of the child's testimony is apt to be very powerful. The potential for overassessment is great. There are no external
guarantees of reliability and thus no inherent indicia of reliability to
support this effect upon the jury. The jury will not be as cognizant of
the missing element of confrontation, the lack of face-to-face confrontation, as the jury is of the complete lack of confrontation in the
hearsay exceptions. The appearance of confrontation under the Maryland procedure, without the underlying evidence possessing any indi-

cia of reliability, creates a much greater risk that the jury will improperly overassess the credibility of the evidence in question. Accordingly, the evidence admitted under the Maryland procedure is not

214. See Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279 (Ct. App. 1984) ("[lIt is
quite conceivable that the credibility of a witness whose testimony is presented via closedcircuit television may be enhanced by the phenomenon called status--conferral; it is recognized that the media bestows prestige and enhances the authority of an individual by legitimizing his status."); GERARD R. MILLER & NORMAN E. FONTES, REEL VERSUS REAL:
WHAT'S THE VERDICT? THE EFFECTS OF VIDEOTAPED COURT MATERIALS ON JUROR RESPONSE 74 (Nat'l Science Found. 1978) ("[Tihe presentation of a witness' testimony via videotape, as opposed to a live appearance, will enhance the perceived credibility of the witness."); Michael H. Graham, hIdicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 75 (1985); W. James
Potter, Perceived Reality and the Cultivation Hypothesis, 30 J.BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC
MEDIA 159, 162 (1986) (explaining the "Magic Window" theory that states, for example, that
many viewers believe news shows are "accurate, complete, unbiased, and objective pictures of
'the way it is."'); Charles E. Wilson, Jr., Criminal Procedure-PresumedGuilty: The Use of
Videotaped and Closed-Circuit Televised Testimony in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions and the
Defendant's Right to Confrontation-Coy v. Iowa, 11 CAMPBELL L. REv. 381, 390 (1989)
('The jury may give extra weight to the child testimony delivered via closed-circuit or videotape television . . . Studies indicate that some viewers tend to perceive what they see on
television as accurate."); see also supra note 198 (listing sources that discuss the belief that
children may lie about sexual abuse once on the stand).
215. See Jean Montoya, On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1259, 1302 (1992); see also Hochheiser, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79 ("[T]here are serious questions about the effects on the jury of using closed circuit television to present the testimony
of an absent witness since the camera becomes the juror's eyes, selecting and commenting
upon what is seen." The court also acknowledges that closed-circuit television testimony "may
affect the presumption of innocence by creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors towards
the defendant similar to that created by the use of physical restraints on a defendant in the
jury's presence."). See generally Susan H. Evans, Comment, Criminal Procedure-Closed
Circuit Television in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Keeping the Balance Between Realism and
Idealism-Maryland v Craig, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471, 501 (1991) (pointing out that
the Supreme Court has not yet been faced with the argument that the closed-circuit television
procedure deprives defendants of the presumption of innocence and so this issue has not yet
been finally settled).
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as reliable as the evidence admitted under the hearsay exceptions. 6
The second principle supporting the hearsay exceptions is necessity.217 If the evidence is not admitted despite the absence of faceto-face confrontation, its potentially beneficial value is lost completely.2"' Although this arguably applies to the child's testimony in
child abuse cases, the key is that the more necessary the evidence,
the greater the potential that the jury may overassess it and thereby
erroneously convict an innocent defendant.1 9 The principle of necessity would support the admission of untested evidence in any given
case only if there were assurances that the evidence is more probative
than prejudicial. As applied to the traditional hearsay exceptions, these
assurances are provided by the external guarantees of trustworthiness
which give it inherent indicia of reliability. Again, there are no such
external guarantees of trustworthiness or inherent indicia of reliability
with respect to child abuse testimony. Even though child abuse testimony is subject to some of the elements of confrontation, since the
greatest risk to its reliability-is the sincerity of the witness, and the
most effective test to insure the sincerity of the witness (face-to-face
confrontation) is not available under the Maryland procedure, the
evidence admitted under the Maryland procedure is not as reliable as
the evidence admitted under the hearsay exceptions. The evidence
admitted under the Maryland procedure meets neither the reliability
nor the necessity principles which justify the traditional hearsay exceptions."'

216. Inasmuch as the Court relies upon the hearsay rule to justify its conclusion that the
benefits of the Maryland procedure exceed the costs associated with the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction, the analysis appears to be back to square one. The issue
appears to be whether the costs to the witness from face-to-face confrontation may be so
high as to justify withholding the right to face-to-face confrontation in certain cases. So
viewed, the Court's opinion appears to reason that at least where the witness may be subject
to undue trauma, and the increased probability of an erroneous conviction is kept to a mini-

mum, the reduced trauma to the witness may exceed the costs associated with increased risk
of an erroneous conviction. So stated, the Court's opinion in Maryland v. Craig constitutes a
repudiation of the long standing constitutional presumption that the costs associated with
eliminating face-to-face confrontation exceed the costs to the witness.

217. See supra note 195.
218.
219.
220.
validity

WIGMORE, supra note 194, § 1421.
See Kaplan, supra note 195, at 1801-02.
If the necessity principle is looked at from the macro point of view, then there is
to the analogy to the hearsay exceptions. See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying

text.
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The Court Overestimated the Savings that Would
Derive from the Elimination of Face-to-Face Confrontation
In comparing the Maryland procedure to the right to face-to-face
confrontation, the Court presumed that these were the only two available options and that the dispositive issue was which approach more
efficiently insured the reliability of the evidence. In light of the individualized findings of trauma in such cases, the savings from employing the Maryland procedure appear to be substantial. The Court
failed, however, to include a third option: in certain cases it is more
efficient if the witness simply does not testify. Witnesses who do not
testify are spared from confronting the defendant face-to-face, and
there is no increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction;
there is, however, an increase in the probability of an erroneous ac2quittal. Still, the cost of an erroneous acquittal is relatively low. '
The cost of an erroneous acquittal is the net social loss suffered from
decreasing the probability that those who actually engage in the criminal activity will be apprehended and convicted. 2' An erroneous acquittal in any given case will affect the probability of apprehension
and conviction by much less than 1 percent, producing a negligible
increase in the total social costs of crime.
While the expected cost to a witness from face-to-face confrontation is less than the expected cost of an erroneous acquittal, it is
conceivable that where there is an individualized finding that the
witness would experience trauma from face-to-face confrontation, the
cost of the trauma may exceed the expected cost of an erroneous
acquittal. In such cases, the witness simply would not come forward
and press charges or participate in the prosecution in the offense.
Nevertheless, this behavior may be efficient from a societal point of
view. If the cost to the witness exceeds the net social loss which follows from the negligible increase in the probability of an erroneous
acquittal as a result of the witness not coming forward and testifying,
from an economic perspective, it would be better for the witness simply not to testify and run the risk of an erroneous acquittal. The
increased cost associated with the increased risk of an erroneous
acquittal in such a case is less than both the cost to the witness and
the increased cost associated with the increased risk of an erroneous
3.

221. POSNER, supra note 13, at 553.
222. The net social loss is "limited to the increase in the total social costs of crime
resulting from having thus reduced the probability of punishing criminal activity." POSNER,
supra note 33, at 521.
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conviction if there is no right to face-to-face confrontation.'

As

223. The cost of an erroneous acquittal is the highest possible cost of the witness's refusal to testify. If there is other admissible evidence, the witness's refusal to testify may have
little impact upon the probability of an erroneous acquittal. Where, however, the witness is
the victim and the bulk of the evidence against the defendant is the witness's testimony, the
witness's refusal to testify may increase the probability of an erroneous acquittal to 100 percent. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) ("Child abuse is one of the most
difficult problems to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim.").
The first point to note is that the cost of the emotional distress experienced by the
witness is less than the cost of an erroneous conviction. The cost of an erroneous conviction
imposes similar psychological damages upon the wrongly convicted defendant, and there are
the additional costs incurred by the defendant and society in punishing the defendant. See
supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. While the cost of the anxiety, and in some cases
even trauma, to the witness no doubt may be great, the cost is secondary and incidental in
nature. The primary emotional distress is the product of the underlying criminal conduct.
While having to confront the alleged perpetrator face-to-face no doubt imposes significant
costs upon the witness, the aggregate costs to the individual defendant and to society of an
erroneous conviction are greater.
The comparison of the cost of the emotional distress experienced by the witness to
the cost of an erroneous acquittal, however, is not as clear-cut. The cost of an erroneous
acquittal is tied to the level of criminal activity for that crime. An erroneous acquittal decreases the probability that a criminal will be apprehended and convicted, which decreases the
net punishment for a crime, which increases the total social costs of crime. POSNER, supra
note 13, at 553. Considering, however, the total number of crimes and the total social costs
of crime, the effect of a single erroneous acquittal in any given case is not that costly.
POSNER, supra note 13, at 553. The negative effect a single erroneous acquittal has on the
probability that a criminal will be apprehended and convicted arguably is less than 1 percent,
which in turn would have minimal impact upon the net punishment associated with the
crime, which in turn would have a de mnininis effect upon the total social costs of crime.
Accordingly, the cost of an erroneous acquittal, while significant, is not anywhere near as
great as the cost of an erroneous conviction. POSNER, supra note 13, at 553. In comparing
the cost of an erroneous acquittal to the cost of the emotional distress a witness may experience from face-to-face confrontation, the conclusion must be bifurcated. On one hand, for
the vast majority of witnesses the cost of face-to-face confrontation is negligible, an amount
less than the cost of an erroneous acquittal. On the other hand, no doubt there are some
extraordinary cases where face-to-face confrontation can be traumatizing and very costly to
the witness, so costly that the costs to the witness arguably exceed the costs of an erroneous
acquittal.
Accordingly, from a law and economics perspective, the Supreme Court's traditional
analysis and rule that the defendant is entitled to a right to face-to-face confrontation is defensible. The right to face-to-face confrontation produces a net benefit in that it reduces the
risk of an erroneous conviction more than it increases the risk of an erroneous acquittal.
Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, this net benefit from the reduction in the total cost
of error exceeds the cost of the rule in terms of the emotional distress to the witness. Although there may be a few extraordinary cases, arguendo, in which the cost of the trauma to
the witness arguably would exceed the net benefit to society from the right to face-to-face
confrontation, however, before the cost to the witness would exceed the net benefit from
face-to-face confrontation, the cost to the witness would exceed the cost of an erroneous
conviction. Accordingly, it makes more sense in such cases for the state simply not to call
the witness and run the increased risk of an erroneous acquittal than to call the witness but
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long as a sufficient number of complainants and witnesses are coming
forward to ensure that society can achieve the necessary level of net
punishment to ensure the effective enforcement of the statute in question, it would be more efficient for some witnesses simply not to
testify and thus to increase the probability of an erroneous acquittal
than to endure the costs of trauma they would suffer if forced to
testify. 4
Again, Justice Scalia persuasively argued this point, though not
in economic terms per se, in his dissent:
The Court characterizes the State's interest which "outweigh[s]" the explicit text of the Constitution as an "interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims," ante,
at 853, an "interest in protecting" such victims "from the emotional
trauma of testifying," ante, at 855. That is not so. A child who
meets the Maryland statute's requirement of suffering such "serious
emotional distress" from confrontation that he "cannot reasonably
communicate" would seem entirely safe. Why would a prosecutor
want to call a witness who cannot reasonably communicate? And if
he did, it would be the State's own fault. Protection of the child's
interest-as far as the Confrontation Clause is concemed-is entirely
within Maryland's control. The State's interest here is in fact no
more and no less than what the State's interest always is when it
seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal proceedings:
more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an unworthy
interest, but it should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one.
And the interest on the other side is also what it usually is
when the State seeks to get a new class of evidence admitted: fewer
convictions of innocent defendants-specifically, in the present context, innocent defendants accused of particularly heinous crimes. The
'special' reasons that exist for suspending one of the usual guarantees of reliability in the case of children's testimony are perhaps
matched by 'special' reasons for being particularly insistent upon it
in the case of children's testimony. Some studies show that children
are substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and
often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from
reality.'

not give the defendant the right to face-to-face confrontation and run the increased risk of an
erroneous conviction. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Why would a
prosecutor want to call a witness who cannot reasonably communicate?").
224. See supra notes 222-25.
225. Craig, 497 U.S. at 867-68.
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In Maryland v. Craig, the Court found that in certain cases there may
be individualized findings that the trauma to the witness may be so
2 26
great that it exceeds the net benefits of face-to-face confrontation.
The problem with that statement is that before the cost to the witness
could exceed the net benefit of face-to-face confrontation, the cost
would exceed the expected costs associated with an increase in the
probability of an erroneous acquittal if the witness did not testify. Not
to call the witness makes more economic sense than it does to call
the witness and not subject the witness to face-to-face confrontation.
The key is not the cost of the trauma the witness would experience if
forced to testify face-to-face, but the expected costs to society from
an increase in the probability of an erroneous acquittal. The Court's
focus on the trauma to the witness if called to testify is misplaced.2 7
4.

The Court Failed to Include the Direct Costs of the
Maryland Procedure in Its Analysis
The Court exacerbates its overestimation of the direct savings of
elimination of face-to-face confrontation by its failure to include the
direct costs of the Maryland procedure as a cost to be deducted from
such savings. In analyzing the costs and benefits of the right to faceto-face confrontation and the Maryland procedure, economic analysis
requires the Court to consider the direct costs of each of the respective rules. 2 8 Although the Court went to great lengths to emphasize
the high direct costs associated with the right to face-to-face confrontation in some cases (the trauma to the witness), 9 the Court failed
to even mention the direct costs associated with the Maryland procedure.
Inasmuch as the Court expressly held that the Maryland proce-

226. Id. at 853.
227. The criticisms listed above attack the Court's assessment of the costs and benefits
of eliminating face-to-face confrontation. Assuming the criticisms are valid, the bottom line is
that the Court should have increased the cost of eliminating face-to-face confrontation and
decreased the benefits of eliminating it. The problem, however, is that since no absolute
values can be assigned to either the cost or the benefit of eliminating face-to-face confrontation, the ultimate comparison is as much qualitative as quantitative. To the extent that the
Court's analysis depends upon its assessment of the relative costs and benefits of eliminating
face-to-face confrontation, the Court's opinion gives little guidance as to the scope of the
Court's opinion and hence what is left of the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation.
228. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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dure may be employed only where there is an individualized finding
that the witness will suffer undue costs from having to testify face-toface, 30 the direct costs incurred to make such a finding will be significant. Such a finding can be made only after a hearing on the
issue, a hearing which will impose administrative costs on the witness, 23 on the attorneys in the case, the court system, and on the
expert witnesses who will no doubt have to examine the witness and
testify pro and con.232 The expected direct costs of the judicial hearing under the Maryland procedure are much greater than the expected
direct costs under the hearsay exceptions. Moreover, these high direct
costs will be incurred not only in those cases where the Maryland
procedure is actually employed, but in other cases where the witness
unsuccessfully attempts to invoke the procedure. And if the witness is
successful in invoking the Maryland procedure, there will be additional direct costs associated with the actual mechanical operations of the
procedure. In the aggregate, the expected direct costs of the Maryland
procedure are much greater than the expected direct costs of the
hearsay exceptions. The difference in the magnitude of the expected
direct costs further undermines the validity of the Court's analogy to
the hearsay exceptions as support for eliminating the right to face-toface confrontation in child abuse cases.
Although the Court's cost-benefit analysis originally appeared to
be consistent with a law and economics analysis, upon closer examination the Court's analysis is highly questionable. In analyzing the
Maryland procedure, the Court: (1) underestimated the increase in the
probability of an erroneous conviction, and thus the increase in the
expected cost of error; (2) incorrectly assumed that the evidence
admitted under the Maryland procedure is just as reliable as the evidence admitted under the hearsay exceptions; (3) overestimated the
benefits to be derived from the Maryland procedure's elimination of
face-to-face confrontation; and (4) failed to include the high direct
costs associated with the Maryland procedure. The problem with
saying that the Court's opinion is indefensible from a law and economics perspective, however, is that the law and economics theory

230. "The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one." Craig,
497 U.S. at 855.
231. Although the purpose of the hearing is to minimize the aggregate amount of trauma
inflicted upon the witness, having to discuss the incident and to think and talk about confronting the alleged perpetrator will inflict some emotional distress upon the witness.
232. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840-42.
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purports to be both normative and descriptive.233 The theory is normative in that it predicts how rational beings should act, and descriptive in that it helps to explain why rational beings act the way they
do.234 If the Supreme Court's opinion is inconsistent with a normative analysis of the issue, why, as the Court pointed out, have a
significant majority of the states adopted some type of procedure to
protect the child witness from the trauma of testifying face-to-face
against the defendant in child abuse cases?235 The reason is because
the costs of face-to-face confrontation do exceed the benefits in child
abuse cases, it is just that the Court missed the reason why this is so.
The reason why the costs exceed the benefits lies in the Court's
analogy to the hearsay exceptions.
VI.

THE COURT'S ANALOGY TO THE HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS:
TAKING A MACRO VIEW

Although the Court's analogy of the Maryland procedure to the
hearsay exceptions is appealing, the Court's analogy is incomplete. As
is true with any procedural rule, the economic analysis of the hearsay
exceptions turns on a comparison of the total costs of the hearsay
exceptions versus the total costs of the alternative: the requirement of
face-to-face confrontation:
TC W/ FTFC = (P of EC)(C of EC)
+ (P of EA)(C of EA) + DIRECT COSTS OF FTFC
VS.
TC W/ HEARSAY EXCPTNS = (P of EC)(C of EC)
+ (P of EA)(C of EA) + DIRECT COST OF HEARSAY EXCPTNS.
The cost of an erroneous conviction and the cost of an erroneous
acquittal will be the same for both scenarios, and the cost of an
erroneous conviction is greater than the cost of an erroneous acquittal. 6 The critical variables are: the probability of an erroneous conviction, the probability of an erroneous acquittal, and the expected
direct costs of each rule.
The driving variables behind the hearsay exceptions are the expected direct costs and probability of an erroneous acquittal if face-to233.
234.
235.
236.

See POSNER supra note 13, at 23.
See id.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 853-54.
See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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face confrontation was required. If there were no hearsay exceptions
to the right of face-to-face confrontation, the cost of obtaining direct
evidence in a hearsay situation would be either prohibitively high or
simply impossible. ' 7 For each case where it is impossible to obtain
the evidence, the effect would be to increase the probability of an
erroneous judgment, and more likely than not, the probability of an
erroneous acquittal. The key, however, is the how often obtaining
direct evidence would actually be prohibitively expensive or simply
impossible. If the number of such cases were relatively small, the
resulting costs (be they increased direct costs or, where it is impossible to obtain the evidence, increased indirect costs as a result of the
increase in the probability of an erroneous acquittal) would still be
less than the increased costs which would result from eliminating
face-to-face confrontation (as a result of the increased risk of an
erroneous conviction).2 8
If, however, the number of cases in which obtaining direct evidence would be prohibitively expensive or impossible is great enough,
then the direct and/or indirect costs inherent in requiring face-to-face
confrontation would exceed the increased costs which would result
from eliminating face-to-face confrontation and it would make sense
to eliminate face-to-face confrontation. While the probability of an
erroneous conviction is usually of greater concern because of the
greater cost of an erroneous conviction, if (1) the increase in the
direct costs (the prohibitively high costs of obtaining the direct evidence) and/or the increase in the probability of an erroneous acquittal
(in those cases where obtaining the direct evidence is impossible) if
face-to-face confrontation were retained, is substantially greater than
(2) the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction if faceto-face confrontation were eliminated, then (3) the magnitude of the
direct costs and costs associated with the increase in the probability
of an erroneous acquittal will more than offset the greater costs associated with the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction.
While admitting testimony under the hearsay exceptions without
subjecting it to face-to-face confrontation no doubt will increase the
risk of an erroneous conviction, the requirement that the evidence
bear inherent indicia of reliability minimizes the risk. 9 As noted
above, evidence is admitted under the hearsay exceptions only if its

237. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 85 (4th ed. Teacher's Manual).
238. See supra notes 222-28.
239. See supra notes 194-216.
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probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, i.e., only if there are
external guarantees of trustworthiness which vest it with inherent
indicia of reliability. 20 The effect of this requirement is to minimize
the increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction, and thus
the expected cost of error under the hearsay exceptions. In addition,
the expected direct costs of the hearsay exceptions procedure are low.
Where there are a disproportionately high number of cases in
which the cost of obtaining direct evidence is prohibitively high or
impossible, if there were no hearsay exceptions to the right to face-toface confrontation there would be: (1) a low probability of an erroneous conviction, but (2) an extraordinarily high probability of an erroneous acquittal and/or high direct costs. In contrast, where there is a
disproportionately high number of cases in which the cost of obtaining direct evidence is prohibitively high or impossible, but there are
hearsay exceptions to the right to face-to-face confrontation, there
would be: (1) a higher probability of an erroneous conviction, but not
much higher in light of the judicial hearing on the reliability of the
evidence; and (2) a much lower probability of an erroneous acquittal
and/or direct costs:
TC w/FTFC: LOW P of EC + HIGH P of EA + HIGH DC
VS.
TC w/ HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: SLIGHTLY HIGHER P of EC +
MUCH LOWER P of EA + MUCH LOWER DC.
The adoption of the hearsay exceptions implicitly reflects the qualitative conclusion that the savings from the decrease in the high direct
costs/probability of an erroneous acquittal outweighs the costs inherent
in the slight increase in the probability of an erroneous conviction.
Without the hearsay exceptions, society would not be able to
enforce effectively its criminal laws.24 Accordingly, the hearsay exceptions exist because of the frequency of situations in which direct
240. The court must first determine that the witness is unavailable, but even then the
evidence must have external guarantees of trustworthiness which give it inherent indicia of

reliability. See supra notes 194-200.
241.

See United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1975) (describ-

ing the purpose of one of the hearsay exceptions, the informers privilege, as the "furtherance
and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement" (emphasis added)); see also
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (explaining that in determining the validity of
any hearsay exception the Court recognizes the significance of every jurisdiction's "strong
interest in effective law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the
rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings" (emphasis added)).
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evidence would be either prohibitively expensive or impossible to

obtain and not because in any given case the direct cost of obtaining
the evidence would be either prohibitively expensive or impossible to

obtain.
Understanding the economic justification for the hearsay excep-

tions is critical because it clarifies the perspective from which the
right to face-to-face confrontation should be analyzed. The issue is

not the micro level amount of trauma which any one child abuse
witness may experience from face-to-face confrontation, but rather the
macro level issue of whether a disproportionately high number of witnesses would experience the trauma such that the expected direct cost
of obtaining such evidence would be prohibitively expensive or simply impossible. This macro level emphasis on the frequency with
which the problem occurs and its effect upon the effective enforce-

ment of the criminal laws is important because it matches the problem underlying the issue in Maryland v. Craig.242
VII.

THE REAL PROBLEM UNDERLYING MARYLAND V. CRAIG IS NOT
THE TRAUMA TO THE WITNESS BUT RATHER THE EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD ABUSE LAWS

As Justice Scalia argued in dissent, the real problem underlying
the issue in Maryland v. Craig is the effective enforcement of child

abuse laws against guilty defendants.

3

Pursuant to the law and eco-

242. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
243. Id. at 867. If the only problem was the amount of trauma a child abuse victim may
suffer as a result of having to testify face-to-face against the defendant, the obvious solution
would simply be not to call the victim if he or she would suffer undue trauma if called as a
witness. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Why would a prosecutor want to call a witness who
cannot reasonably communicate?"). The problem with -this solution, however, is that in a
number of child abuse cases, the victim's testimony is essential to the prosecutor's case.
Without the testimony there would be little chance of successfully prosecuting the charge
against the defendant. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) ("Child abuse is
one of'the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are
no witnesses except the victim."). Not calling the child abuse victims, so as to avoid the
trauma caused by face-to-face confrontation, is tantamount to dropping the charges against the
defendant. While not calling the child abuse victim who would suffer undue trauma from
face-to-face confrontation would clearly eliminate the potential trauma to the victim, this
approach impairs the state's ability to effectively enforce its child abuse laws. Accordingly,
the state's real concern in Maryland v. Craig is not the trauma face-to-face confrontation
inflicts upon any given child abuse witness in any given case, but rather the state's ability to
effectively enforce its child abuse laws. Thus, the real issue at stake in Maryland v. Craig is
whether the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation furthers the effective enforcement
of a state's child abuse laws.
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nomics view of criminal law, the effective enforcement of criminal
laws means. that society achieves the level of deterrence it desires.2'

For society to achieve the level of deterrence it desires, the net punishment associated with the undesirable conduct must be high enough
that a sufficient number of individuals'who contemplate engaging in
the criminal conduct are deterred.245

In the event society is not achieving effective enforcement of a
given criminal law, that is, in the event the rate of crime for a given

activity is unacceptably high, the logical response is simply to adjust
the combination of (1) the severity of punishment, and (2) the probability of apprehension and conviction, so as to increase the net punishment and thereby decrease the rate of crime.' As between the
variables, the more efficient (and common) response is to increase the

severity of the punishment. 47 Assuming the rate of apprehension

244. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
246. See Becker, supra note 23, at 177-78, see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 12
(describing the common response of more severe punishment for repeat as opposed to firsttime offenders). See generally, POSNER, supra note 13, at 223-31 (acknowledging society's
heavy reliance upon imprisonment, but then offering the possible alternative of a far-reaching
fine system).
247. See Becker supra note 23, at 176, 178; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 10 n.48;
Posner, supra note 23, at 1204, 1206. When criminalizing conduct, society must set the level
of punishment associated with a particular activity, so that when the severity of punishment is
discounted by the probability of apprehension and conviction, the net punishment is still
greater than the benefits the actor anticipates receiving from engaging in the criminal activity.
See POSNER, supra note 13, at 220-21. In the event the level of punishment does not achieve
the level of deterrence society desires, society has two options: (1) it can increase the degree
of punishment for the conduct in question, or (2) it can increase the probability that the
defendant will be apprehended and convicted. The literature agrees that the former is the
preferred response. Increasing the punishment is more efficient than increasing the probability
that the defendant will be apprehended and convicted. The latter costs more because not only
must society incur the costs associated with increasing the probability that the actor will be
apprehended and convicted but for each additional defendant apprehended and convicted,
society must incur the costs associated with punishing the person. In contrast, simply increasing the punishment for the conduct in question results in no additional costs associated with
apprehension and conviction, and only marginal costs associated with the increased term of
the punishment. Accordingly, in the event society determines that the degree of deterrence
associated with a crime is not acceptable, the norm is to increase the severity of the punishment for the crime. There is, however, a limitation to this principle. As the punishment for
the crime increases, the punishment has a cost in terms of deterring people from engaging in
related legal activity. There is always the risk that a person may accidentally commit the
crime or that the person may be falsely accused of the crime. The greater the punishment
associated with the crime, the less willing people are going to be to engage in socially useful
activities which may expose them to the risk of accidentally committing the crime or of
facilitating false accusations of having committed the crime. Accordingly, there is a limit on
how high the punishment can be raised before the externality costs of the increase associated
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and conviction remains the same, increasing the severity of the punishment increases the net punishment. The cost of increasing the net
punishment by increasing the severity of the punishment is simply the
marginal cost involved in increasing the severity of the punish-

ment. 248 In contrast, increasing the net punishment by increasing the
rate of apprehension and conviction is much costlier from a societal
perspective. 49 The cost of increasing the rate of apprehension and
conviction is greater than the cost of increasing the severity of the
punishment because the former includes the latter. Increasing the rate
of apprehension and conviction involves not only the costs inherent in
increasing the rate, but also the increased rate of apprehension and
conviction will lead to at least the same if not greater costs for the
punishment phase than are involved in a corresponding increase in the
severity of the punishment." The preferred response to an unac-

with the punishment exceed the benefits of increasing the punishment. In light of the limitation to the principle that it is always more efficient to raise the punishment than it is to
increase the probability of apprehension and conviction, in certain cases the appropriate response to a lower level of deterrence than desired is to increase the probability of apprehension and conviction. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
A review of the history of the crime of child sexual abuse shows that many states
followed this exact pattern. As the states realized that the rate of child sexual abuse was
unacceptable, the legislatures responded first by increasing the punishment for the conduct in
question. Even after increasing the punishment as high as the legislatures thought possible,
however, the rate of child sexual abuse continued to be unacceptably high. The states responded by increasing the resources allocated towards apprehending and convicting those
engaging in child sexual abuse. However, the rate of child sexual abuse continued at an
unacceptably high level. Further research showed that the problem was not that the punishment was not severe enough, nor that the apprehension and conviction rate was too low, but
rather that -too few complainants were coming forward.
248. If the apprehension and conviction rate is .10 and the severity of the punishment is
10 years, the net punishment is 1 year. If the severity of the punishment is increased to 20
years, the net punishment is increased to 2 years. The only increase in the net social cost is
the cost incurred in keeping the same number of defendants incarcerated for the additional
year. POSNER, supra note 13, at 230.
249. Assuming the rate of apprehension and conviction is .10 and the severity of the
punishment is 10 years, to increase the net punishment from I year to 2 years will require
an increase in the rate of apprehension and conviction from .10 to .20. The immediate costs
are -obviously those costs involved in increasing the apprehension and conviction rate. In
addition, there will be the costs involved in incarcerating the additional defendants convicted
as a result of the increase in the apprehension and conviction rate. Although the net number
of years is the same as under increasing the severity of the punishment, because more defendants are involved in the increase in the rate of apprehension and conviction, the net social
cost for the punishment alone is at least as great, if not greater, than under the increase in
the rate of apprehension and conviction, and that does not even include the additional costs
incurred in increasing the rate of apprehension and conviction itself.
250. Instead of one defendant being imprisoned for two years, there will be two defendants imprisoned for one year.
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ceptable rate of crime for a particular offense is to increase the punishment.
There are, however, limits to how high the punishment for a
crime can be increased. First, the higher the punishment, the less
willing individuals will be to engage in related but legal activities.
There are always the risks of accidental commission of the crime or a
wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant. Thus, the higher the
punishment, the more likely people will be to decline to engage in
socially productive and legal related activities.' In addition, the
higher the punishment for a particular crime, the less incentive a
criminal has for not engaging in additional crimes during the course
of his conduct." For example, if the punishment for child sexual
abuse was raised to fifty years to life, and the punishment for murder
was fifty years to life, then a criminal willing to commit child sexual
abuse would have little incentive not to kill his or her victim."
There is a cap on how severely society can punish a crime.
Once society has raised the level of punishment to its most efficient level, if the rate of crime for the activity remains unacceptably
high, then society must turn to increasing the rate of apprehension
and conviction. Increasing the rate of apprehension and conviction
involves increasing the resources devoted towards apprehending suspects and processing charges against defendants: increasing the number of police officers or investigators assigned to an area; improving
the technology the officers and investigators have available to them;
increasing the number of prosecutors assigned to an area to give each
one greater time to devote to each case; increasing the support given
to each such prosecutor (administrative support, expert support, etc.);
and increasing the number of judges.5 4

251. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 14; Posner, supra note 23, at 1206.
252. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 13-14. See generally George Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526. 527 (1970).
253. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 14. For that matter, one could even argue that the
higher the punishment for child sexual abuse and the closer the punishment gets to the punishment for murder, the more incentive the criminal may have for killing his or her victim.
He or she may think that killing the victim would further reduce the probability that the
defendant would be apprehended and convicted.

254. See supra note 25.
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A.

An Economic Analysis of the Legislative History of
Child Abuse Statutes

The economic description of how states should seek to achieve

effective enforcement of their criminal laws matches to a large extent
the legislative history of the crime of child sexual abuse. Having

established that child sexual abuse is wrongful and should be
criminalized, the more difficult questions are what is the appropriate
level of net punishment society seeks to achieve and how should it
be achieved. An historical examination of the crime of child sexual
abuse reveals the general pattern which one would expect under the
law and economics theory. After criminalizing child sexual abuse,
each state settled upon a combination of the severity of punishment

and the probability of apprehension and conviction which the state
believed would produce the desired net punishment and level of deterrence. Once the states realized that the initial level of punishment
was not achieving the desired net punishment and level of deterrence,

the states responded by increasing the severity of the punishment for
the crime.2" When this increase still did not achieve the desired net
punishment and level of deterrence, the states responded by increasing
the resources related to the rate of apprehension and conviction of
individuals engaging in child sexual abuse (such as mandatory reporting statutes)."5 The rate of child sexual abuse, however, remained

255. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-104. 5-14-108 (Michie 1993) (Sentence for carnal
abuse has a maximum sentence of twenty years as of 1985, which is an increase from the
1975 maximum sentence of ten years. Sentences for sexual abuse in the first degree also rose
during the same time period from five to ten years.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 768, 773
(1987 & Supp. 1992) (Sentence for sexual assault (contact) rose from two years in 1975 to
seven years in 1985. Sentence for sexual assault (intercourse) during the same time period
rose from seven to a maximum of thirty years.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.04 (West 1992)
(Sentence for lewd and lascivious conduct rose from its 1951 level of ten years to fifteen
years starting in 1971.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4 (1992) (In 1950, indecent molestation held
a maximum sentence of five years. By 1969, the present day sentence of twenty years was
set for child molestation.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:81, 14:81.2 (West Supp. 1993) (In
1974, indecent behavior with juveniles held a maximum sentence of two years. In 1986, the
maximum sentence was raised to five years, and in 1984, a law prohibiting molestation was
established with a maximum sentence of fifteen years.).
256. See Mark A. Small, Policy Review of Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Statutes,
14 LAW & POL'Y 129 (1992); see also Jessica E. Mindlin, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse
and Criminal Statutes of Limitations: A Model for Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV. 189, 197-98
(1990) ("L]egislatures recognize that child sexual abuse is an offense serious enough to
warrant laws which facilitate prosecution of offenders."); id. at 195 n.33 (quoting various
reasons given by states to explain their enactment of laws designed to increase apprehension
and conviction).
One of the most active areas for this type of legislation is in the realm of mandatory
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unacceptably high. The problem was that one of the basic assump-

tions which the law and economics theory makes about human behavior as it affects criminal enforcement did not hold true for the

crime of child sexual abuse.

7

reporting. See Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the
Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 175, 180 (1991) ("As part of the detection process . . . most states enacted mandatory
reporting laws ....
The rationale was that early reporting would prevent further abuses
from occurring."); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.556 (3) (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1990); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 63.1, -248.3, -248.4 (Michie 1991). See generally Seth C. Kalichman &
Cheryl L. Brosig, Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Issues and Implications for Policy,
14 LAW & POL'Y 153 (1992) (discussing the intent of mandatory reporting statutes and providing reasons for low and high rates of reporting). Beyond the basic mandatory reporting
laws there have been refinements. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-517 (Michie Supp. 1993)
(granting immunity to any good-faith reporter of child maltreatment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17a-101(b) (West 1990) (requiring that various professionals (such as school teachers, clergyman, optometrists, chiropractors, licensed family therapists, social workers, dentists, etc.) all
have an equal responsibility to report abuse to the same degree as doctors and surgeons);
Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 315, 325-26 (1987) (explaining the public policy interests which allow for a report to
be based upon less than total certainty) .
The second area of legislative activism involves the tolling of statutes of limitations.
A problem in child sexual abuse cases will arise either when a particular state has no provision for tolling its statute of limitations when the victim is either too young to report within
the prescribed time period, or when the abuser, through coercion, keeps the abused from
being able to report before the statute runs out. See generally Mindlin, supra. While not all
of the states have addressed this problem, there are examples of legislatures and the courts
taking the initiative to preserve the rights of the abused. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-3-5(a)(4)
(Supp. 1992) (one of seven states which does not have a statute of limitations for sexual
abuse crimes involving a victim under the age of sixteen); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-107
(Supp. 1988) (statute of limitation in Arizona will not begin to run until after actual discovery by the state, or from the time discovery should have occurred with exercise of reasonable
diligence); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(h) (Michie Supp. 1987) (the statute will not start until
the abused reaches the age of 18); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15(b)(7) (West 1989) (the statute
will not begin to run until the abused reaches the age of 16); State v. Danielski, 348
N.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (tolling the statute until the abused is no longer
subject to the abuser's authority, where the abused and the abuser shared the same living
quarters and the abuser used authority to both coerce the actual incidents of abuse and then
to keep the abused from reporting the crime until the standard time period for reporting had
legally passed).
257. That, in a nutshell, is the problem the states are having with the crime of child
sexual abuse. As the states realized that the rate of child sexual abuse was unacceptably high,
the states initially responded by increasing the severity of punishment for child sexual abuse.
When the states realized that the rate of child sexual abuse remained unacceptably high even
after increasing the severity of the punishment, the states responded by increasing the rate of
apprehension and conviction. The problem, however, is that these factors apply only to those
victims who come forward, report the crime, and effectively participate in the prosecution of
the cases. The states ultimately realized that the reason the rate of child sexual abuse remained unacceptably high was that a disproportionate number of child abuse victims were not
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As noted above, the law and economics theory of criminal law
postulates that society can achieve effective enforcement of its crimi-

nal laws by adjusting the net punishment associated with an offense
until society achieves the desired level of deterrence." Net punishment is the severity of the punishment for an offense discounted by
the rate of apprehension and conviction. The rate of apprehension and
conviction is based upon the number of victims who come forward
and report the crime. If a disproportionate percentage of victims refuse to come forward and report the crime, the state will not be able

to obtain a sufficiently high rate of apprehension and conviction that
is necessary to achieve effective enforcement of the criminal law in
question (even with an increase in the severity of the punishment).

Accordingly, the opportunity-shaping theory of criminal law implicitly
assumes that an adequate number of victims come forward and partic-

ipate in the prosecution process, so that the net punishment imposed
upon those apprehended and convicted is sufficient to achieve the
socially acceptable net punishment and level of deterrence.
True to the principles underlying the law and economics theory
of human behavior, no doubt the assumption that victims will come

coming forward and pressing charges. See John E.B. Myers, The Legal Response to Child
Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149, 182-83 (1985-86); Doris Stevens
& Lucy Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses, in THE SEXUAL VICr1MOLOGY OF
YOUTH 246, 248 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1980) (detailing the lack of victims and other witnesses who are willing to testify at trial); James A. Napoli, Comment, Closed Circuit Television Testimony for the Sexually Abused Child: The Right to Confrontation, 27 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 117, 118 (1987) (stating that children "are reluctant witnesses and sometimes retract
prior testimony to absolve an assailant who is a family member [or] because they are frightened of the defendants"); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions:
Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807 (1985) ("They are reluctant witnesses . . . [a]nd parents sometimes decline to press charges rather than subject their abused
child to the ordeal of extended litigation."). If a disproportionate percentage of victims either
fail to come forward and report the crime or are unable to effectively participate in the prosecution of the crime, then society will be greatly impaired in its efforts to effectively discourage the criminal conduct in question. The natural question then is to ask why these
victims are either unwilling to come forward or unable to participate effectively in the prosecution process. The states determined that a disproportionate number of child abuse victims
were either not coming forward or were unable to participate effectively in the prosecution
process principally because of the trauma associated with prosecuting the crime, and in particular the trauma associated with having to testify face to face against the perpetrator of the
crime. Having identified the cause of the ineffective enforcement of the child sexual abuse
laws, the logical response is to strive to eliminate, or at least minimize, the trauma. The
problem with eliminating the trauma, however, is that the only way to eliminate the trauma
is to eliminate the face to face confrontation, and eliminating face to face confrontation raises
the issue of the scope of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.
258. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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forward and report crimes is based on the assumption that the bene-

fits of coming forward exceed the costs. In theory, and for the most
part in practice, the benefits to victims of crime who come forward,
report the crimes, and participate in the prosecution process generally
do exceed the costs. Among the principal benefits are feelings of fulfilling one's civic duty and revenge. Although these benefits are intangible, that does not make them any less real or valuable. On the

other side of the equation, the criminal justice system is structured so
as to minimize the costs to the victim. The state prosecutes the matter
at its expense. For many crimes, the only costs imposed on the victim are the opportunity costs associated with prosecuting the matter,
and the emotional distress, if any, of the prosecution process. Accord-

ingly, the law and economics theory assumes that for the vast majority of crimes, both at the micro level (any particular case) and at the
macro level (the nature of the crime generally), the benefits to the
victim of coming forward and prosecuting charges outweigh the costs
to the victim. 9 The problem is that the assumption does not hold

true for a disproportionately high percentage of victims of child sexual abuse.2"
The problem with the effective enforcement of child abuse laws
was that not enough victims were coming forward and prosecuting
charges to enable society to achieve the desired net punishment and
corresponding level of deterrence. The states concluded that one of

the reasons, if not the principal reason, the reluctant complainants
were not coming forward was the trauma to the complainant from
participating in the prosecution process, and in particular, the trauma

259. For the most part, the crimes where this does not hold true are relatively minor
crimes where the social costs involved are relatively minor, and society is less concerned
about the problem of the reluctant victims in that setting.
260. For most crimes the benefits to the victim of coming forward and testifying against
the defendant will outweigh the costs associated with testifying face-to-face, and society can
reap the benefits of face-to-face confrontation (minimizing the conviction of innocent defendants) at little cost. In contrast, in the case of child sexual abuse, the age of the victim and
the facts surrounding the typical crime will mean that in many cases, the victim will not
sense any anger or seek any revenge against the defendant, but only sense fear at best. In
addition, the age of the victim will usually mean that the victim will not appreciate his or
her civic duty to come forward and prosecute the matter to protect others from this individual. The net result is that the victim of child sexual abuse realizes no real benefit from coming forward and testifying. At the same time the victim will realize a whole host of social
costs associated with being stigmatized as the victim of child sexual abuse. Interestingly, the
older the victim, the greater the possibility that the victim may appreciate the benefits of
coming forward and prosecuting, and the greater the social costs associated with coming
forward and prosecuting.
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associated with having to confront, face-to-face, the alleged perpetrator."' The literature is replete with evidence that victims of child
abuse who come forward, report the offense, and participate in the
prosecution process suffer a great deal of trauma.262 The amount and

severity of trauma arguably is greater than almost any other crime.
The percentage of victims who will suffer this trauma arguably is
also greater than almost any other crime.263 The literature also establishes that one of the principal causes, if not the main cause, of the
trauma is the trauma associated with having to face and testify
against, face-to-face, the perpetrator."
Having identified the problem hindering the effective enforcement
of child sexual abuse laws, namely, that not enough victims are coming forward, and having identified one of the principal causes of the
problem, specifically, the trauma inflicted upon the victim from having to testify face-to-face against the defendant, the solution is obvi-

ous: develop a narrowly tailored special procedure265 by which the

261. See supra note 50.
262. See supra notes 49-51.
263. The only other crimes which come close are different crimes of sexual assault, especially rape, and possibly the crime of spousal abuse. But the physical and psychological age
of the victim of child sexual abuse may distinguish child sexual abuse from these other
crimes.
264. "[The fear and trauma associated with a child's testimony in front of the defendant . . . may so overwhelm the child as to prevent the possibility of effective testimony,
thereby undermining the truth-finding function of the trial itself." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1032 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson,
Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 203-04
(1985); Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809, 813-20 (1987); see also supra note 70.
265. An examination of child abuse statutes demonstrates the variety of ways in which
the states have attempted to define, administer, and hopefully solve the problem facing the
witness in a "narrowly-tailored" fashion.
Probably the most basic way to define the scope of protection is in setting the age at
which child witnesses may invoke the statute's protection: ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1993) (16
and under); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (1993) (13 and under); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44203 (Michie 1994) (17 and under); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-413 (West 1994) (15 and
under); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1993) (12 and under); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55
(1993) (10 and under); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1993) (18 and under); IDAHO CODE § 193024A (1993) (16 and under); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1991) (testimony of
minor televised); IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.1 (West 1993) (period of minority extends to age
18); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1994) (13 and under); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1993) (12 and under); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West
1994) (14 and under).
The states have also set different standards for the level of harm that would qualify a
child witness for protection. Some states require that the possible harm would be severe. NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney
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complainant can testify against the defendant without having to confront the defendant face-to-face." 6 As is often the case, however,
1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9(B)(3) (Michie
1988). Others allow for it to be serious. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55(a)(2) (1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-4-8(d) (Vest 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(2)(1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(B)(1)(b) (Anderson 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.150(l)(c) (West Supp. 1994). Still other states have opted for a more relaxed moderate standard. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1) (West 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.680(2)
(Vernon 1993) (significant psychological or emotional trauma); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 517:13-a (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)(a) (\Vest 1994). Finally, there are a few
states that require the witness to exhibit an inability to communicate along with the possibility of emotional or psychological harm. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.45.046(a)(2) (1993);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(2) (1993); OtIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41(E)(2) (Anderson 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. § 807 (1993).
The standard of proof employed to determine the validity of the possible harm is
another area in which the states have further shaped their individual statutes. Five states
require the judge to apply a "clear and convincing" evidence statute. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1347(b)(2) (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(a) (West 1994); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-3024A(2)(b) (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434(b) (1992); N.Y. CRrM. PROC. LAW
§ 65.10(1) (McKinney 1994). Two states call for a "preponderance" of the evidence standard.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(1) (West 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 517:13-a(I) (1992). While the other statutes do not require an explicit standard of proof,
most do require at least a "substantial likelihood" of harm. FLA. STAT. ANN. §92.54(1) (West
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(e)(1)(b)(i), (iii) (West 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1405(4) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41(E)(3) (Anderson 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 40A60(24) (1992); VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 807 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9(B)(3) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.150(1)(c) (Vest 1993).
266. The procedures at issue in Craig and Coy (one-way closed circuit television and a
sight-blocking screen respectively) are but two alternatives offered as answers to the problem
of trauma. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853-54 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,concurring)
(listing the numerous States which have authorized either videotaped testimony or the use of
one-way or two-way television procedures). At the time Craig was decided thirty-seven states
had adopted the use of videotaped testimony for sexually abused children, twenty-four states
had authorized the use of one-way closed circuit television in the same situations, and eight
states allowed the use of a two-way system in which the child witness is still able to view
the courtroom and the defendant.
Videotape Statutes: ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1993); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134253(B) (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(c)
(West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (West 1994); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(a) (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 3511 (1993); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 92.53 (West 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1993); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-37-48(d) (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558
(1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 278, §16D(2) (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a(5) (West 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-405 to -407 (1991);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.680 (Vernon 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-402 (1993); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-1926 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-17 (Michie 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A) (Anderson 1993); OKLA.
STAT, tit. 22, § 753(C) (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 40A60(24) (1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5984 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law
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the obvious solution only creates new problems. While these procedure undoubtedly reduce the trauma to the witness, any procedure
which permits the complainant to testify without testifying face-to-

face against the defendant arguably conflicts with the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
Having set forth the problem the states were having in achieving
effective enforcement of their child sexual abuse laws, and with con-

flict between the obvious solution and the principle underlying the
right to face-to-face confrontation, the issue at stake in Maryland v.
Craig clarifies itself. As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, the

right to face-to-face confrontation is intended to minimize the costs of
a wrongful conviction. 67 On the other hand, the assumption underlying the right to face-to-face confrontation is that the social costs
associated with the right are de minimis.265 In the case of child
sexual abuse victims, however, the social costs associated with the
right are not de minimis. At the micro level, assuming the defendant
is guilty, the amount of trauma the witness may suffer from having to

face his or her abuser arguably is greater than for any other

Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7116(d), (e), (f) (Supp. 1989); rEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vest Supp. 1994);
UTAH RULE CRIM. PROC. 15.5 (1990); VT. RULE EVID. 807(d) (Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT.
§§ 967.04(7)-(10) (1987-1988); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).
One-way closed circuit television statutes: ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1989); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1989); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.

106A-3 (1987); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-8 (1988); IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-350(1), (3) (Baldwin Supp.
1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-102 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278.16D (West Supp. 1990); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02(4) (1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1405 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-32.4 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT., tit. 22, § 753(B) (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40.460(24) (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5985 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (West Supp.
1990); UTAH RULE CREm. PROC. 15.5 (1990); VT. RULE EvID. 807(d) (Supp. 1989).
Two-way closed circuit television statutes: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(3)(c) (West
Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A(2) (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4)(c)(2) (1988); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(C),
(E) (Anderson 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988); VT. RULE EviD. 807(e)
(Supp. 1989).
267. Craig, 497 U.S. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. See supra note 5; see also supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. The assumptions are (1) that the right to face-to-face confrontation does not materially affect the number
of complainants who come forward and participate in the prosecution process; and (2) that
the expected direct costs of face-to-face confrontation are de minimis.
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crime."' Despite the potential for extreme trauma, however, this
alone would not justify in any given case the repudiation of face-toface confrontation. No matter how high the trauma to the individual
witness, intuitively the cost of that trauma would not match the social
costs associated with an erroneous conviction.27 Thus, to the extent
the Supreme Court's opinion appears to focus on the micro level
costs and benefits of the right to face-to-face confrontation, it is indefensible.
On the other hand, analyzing the issue of the effective enforcement of child sexual abuse laws from the macro level, assuming that
the costs associated with having to testify face-to-face against the
alleged abuser are high enough that a significant number of complainants do not come forward, then the formula has to be recomputed.
The effect of each witness who fails to come forward and participate
in the prosecution process is to increase the probability of an erroneous acquittal. At some point the benefits from face-to-face confrontation in terms of the reduced probability of an erroneous conviction
will be overcome by the high costs associated with the extraordinarily
high direct costs to those witnesses who participate in the prosecution
process and the disproportionately high probability of an erroneous
acquittal as a result of those witnesses who refuse to participate in
the prosecution process because of the anticipated trauma of face-toface confrontation.27 Just as is the case with the hearsay exceptions,
if there are a disproportionately high percentage of cases where the
costs of obtaining the evidence is prohibitively expensive or simply
impossible because of the trauma associated with face-to-face confrontation, then the costs of face-to-face confrontation will exceed the
benefits.2" Although the issue could be stated in terms of at what
point are there enough cases in which the cost of obtaining the evidence is prohibitively expensive or simply impossible such that the
costs of face-to-face confrontation exceed the benefits, the Court
apparently deferred to legislative determination with respect to this
asevidence
is otherwise
point.'
As increased
long as the
reliabilityof of
erroneous
conviction
is more
probability
an the
sured, any

269. This is due to both the nature of the crime and the age of the witness.

270. See supra notes 222-25.
271. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.

273. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855 ("[W]e will not second-guess the considered judgment of the
Maryland Legislature regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child abuse victims

from the emotional trauma of testifying.").
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than offset by the social benefit of decreased direct costs and in-

creased number of witnesses willing and able to come forward and
participate in the prosection of child sexual abuse cases.274
Just as the problem underlying Maryland v. Craig, the ineffective

enforcement of the child sexual abuse statute, can be evaluated from
a macro point of view, so too can the problem at issue in Maryland
v. Craig: the conflict between the Maryland procedure and the right
to face-to-face confrontation under the Confrontation Clause. It has

long been recognized that the right to face-to-face confrontation involved micro level costs (the potential trauma to the witness) and
benefits (the reduced risk of an erroneous conviction). 5 The Confrontation Clause arguably represents the constitutional presumption
that in any given case the benefits of face-to-face confrontation ex-

ceed the costs. This presumption assumes, however, that the right to
face-to-face confrontation either does not affect, or has a de minimis

274. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 851. The problem is that because the Court failed to address
the issue forthrightly, there is not enough evidence to determine whether any modification of
the confrontation is warranted, much less whether the Court should have modified the clause.
Although there is much literature about the trauma the prosecution process inflicts upon the
complainant, there is little literature which attempts to delineate the different sources of the
trauma. While it arguably is unfair to impose these costs upon the innocent child victim, by
eliminating the right to face-to-face confrontation the Court in essence is imposing the cost
upon the defendant. The appropriate question, then, appears to be who should bear the cost.
This question should be examined at both the micro level and the macro level. In terms of
the traditional Sixth Amendment concerns, it appears more appropriate to impose the cost
upon the complainant. So if the complainant is able to bear the costs and continue to prosecute the matter, the complainant should bear the costs because the social costs of imposing
the costs on the complainant are lower. If, however, there is evidence that a significant number of complainants are being deterred from coming forward with their charges, and there is
evidence that this particular complainant is such a complainant, then the question needs to be
addressed from the macro level. The question then becomes, is the social cost greater if faceto-face confrontation is required or eliminated. The state of Maryland apparently found, and
the Court accepted, that the social cost of the lost complainants (which results if the Confrontation Clause is enforced) is greater than the social costs of the increase in the number
of convictions of innocent defendants. The Court apparently felt this risk was minimal as
long as the other elements of the Confrontation Clause are present. The traditional view that
the complainant should bear the costs is also consistent with the economic principle that the
party with the best information should make the decision where there is some uncertainty as
to which course of conduct is more efficient. Since the complainant is in the best position to
determine the amount of trauma he or she may experience from face-to-face confrontation,
putting the decision in the hands of the complainant is consistent with a law and economics
analysis. Once the court is introduced into the process, and the court is asked to determine
the amount of trauma the witness may experience, there are all sorts of concerns which arise,
such as, the court's ability to determine accurately the amount of trauma, or whether complainants will have a greater incentive to claim undue emotional distress.
275. See id. at 846, 853.
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effect upon, the number of complainants who come forward and
participate in the prosecution process. 6 While this assumption is
true for most crimes, there is evidence that for a significant number
of victims of child abuse, the trauma associated with the prosecution
process in general, and face-to-face confrontation in particular, is so
high, that the costs of coming forward and participating in the prosecution process exceed the benefits. 277 For each victim of child abuse
who fails to come forward and participate in the prosecution process,
there is a cost to society in terms of the reduced net punishment for
the crime of child abuse.
At the macro level, while the failure of a few victims to come
forward and prosecute charges will not affect the constitutional presumption that the benefits of face-to-face confrontation exceed the
costs, if enough victims fail to come forward and participate in the
prosecution process (because of the right to face-to-face confrontation)
the macro level costs t6 society will exceed the acknowledged benefits of face-to-face confrontation. In this sense,
the Court's reference
27 8
to the hearsay rule is an appropriate analogy.
Although the Court wants to adopt procedural and evidentiary
rules to minimize the total cost of error 2 9 and in minimizing the
total cost of error the primary concern in most instances will be to
minimize the probability of an erroneous conviction, there will be
situations where the primary concern will be the probability of an
erroneous acquittal. If the procedural or evidentiary rule results in an
inordinately high percentage of victims not coming forward and participating in the prosecution process, as a practical matter each such
case must be counted in calculating the probability of an erroneous

276. For most crimes, there is no evidence of a statistically significant rate of erroneous

acquittals, therefore there is no reason to question the assumption underlying the right to
face-to-face confrontation. In contrast, however, there is strong evidence of a statistically
significant rate of erroneous acquittals with respect to the crime of child abuse, erroneous

acquittals in the form of victims who refuse to come forward and prosecute charges or who
are unable to participate in the prosecution process because of the trauma associated with the
right to face-to-face confrontation. See supra notes 50-51. Accordingly, if the rate of erroneous acquittals due to face-to-face confrontation is high enough, i.e., if the number of victims
of child abuse refuse to come forward and prosecute is high enough, the net social costs of
face-to-face confrontation will exceed the net social benefits of face-to-face confrontation. If

the net social costs exceed the net social benefits, then from a law and economics perspective it makes sense to deny defendants the right to face-to-face confrontation.
277. See supra notes 50-53.

278. Craig, 497 U.S. at 848-49.
279. The combined expected cost of error and the expected direct cost of the rule in

question.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss2/2

84

Wendel: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Right to Face-to-Face Confron
1993]

FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION

acquittal. If the probability of an erroneous acquittal gets high

enough, society cannot effectively enforce its criminal laws. The net
social costs associated with society not being able to enforce effectively its criminal laws must be included in the total costs of the rule
in determining whether the rule increases or decreases the total cost
of error."' If the total cost of face-to-face confrontation exceeds the

total benefit, then the right to face-to-face confrontation no longer
furthers the effective enforcement of child abuse laws. Accordingly,

the Court's conclusion that the cost of face-to-face confrontation in
the child abuse cases exceeds the benefit, and its holding that defendants in child abuse cases may be denied their right to face-to-face

confrontation, are defensible if (1) the macro level cost of the reluctant complainants result in the cost of face-to-face confrontation ex-

ceeding the benefit, and (2) the macro level cost of the reluctant
complainants can be attributed to the right to face-to-face confrontation.

VII.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND V. CRAIG FROM A
MACRO PERSPECTIVE

While the Court's holding in Maryland v. Craig may be defensible from a macro level point of view, the Court's opinion attempts to

rationalize the holding solely from a micro level point of view. From
a law and economics perspective, the outcome is a highly question-

able result-oriented opinion which provides little guidance as to what
is left of the right to face-to-face confrontation."' Because the Court
failed to include the macro level reluctant complainant costs in its
analysis, the Court's conclusion that the costs of face-to-face confron-

tation exceed the benefits in child abuse cases arguably constitutes an
across the board repudiation of the longstanding presumption that the

280. "There is some increase in the social cost of crime as a result of reducing . . . the
probability of punishing criminal activity .... " POSNER, supra note 13, at 553.
281. The flaws in the Court's analysis produce a result-oriented opinion which lacks a
persuasive rationale. More importantly, the Court's analysis constitutes open season on the
right to face-to-face confrontation. The state's interest in minimizing the trauma to witnesses
cannot logically be limited to witnesses in child abuse cases. While the trauma to such witnesses may be more documented and more readily understandable, it is easy to conceive of
other scenarios where the victims, regardless of age, of other crimes may likewise be subjected to extraordinary trauma if required to testify face-to-face against the defendant. The opinion in Maryland v. Craig arguably constitutes a broad attack on the right to face-to-face
confrontation; one which subjects the right to a case by case cost-benefit analysis regardless
of the nature of the offense, the age of the victim, or how the state interest is raised.
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micro benefits inherent in face-to-face confrontation (the reduced risk
of an erroneous conviction of an innocent defendant) exceed
the costs
282
(the uneasiness and trauma it may cause the witness).
Because the Court failed to focus on the macro level reluctant

complainant costs present in child abuse cases, the Court's opinion
lacks a defensible explanation for why child abuse witnesses should
be treated any differently than witnesses in other cases. The only ex-

planation the Court puts forth for why child abuse witnesses should
be treated differently is the state's interest in protecting the physical

and psychological well-being of child abuse victims.283 It is difficult
to see, however, how the state's interest in protecting the well-being
of children who are the victims of child abuse differs that much from

(1) the state's interest in the well-being of children who are the victims of other personal crimes of a heinous nature; and (2) the state's
interest in the well-being of victims of heinous crimes, regardless of
the age of the victim."8 Once the state shows an important state

282. The reason the Court's opinion appears to be such a broad attack on the traditional
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is that the Court's opinion improperly focused on
the trauma a particular child sexual abuse witness may experience. Craig, 497 U.S. at 85157. In contrast, if the Court had viewed the problem at the macro level, the Court would
have realized that the underlying problem in Craig is not the amount of trauma any given
witness may suffer, but rather the net social cost of enforcing the right of face-to-face confrontation against child abuse victims in general.
283. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852-53.
284. The problem with the Court's focus on the trauma to the witness becomes apparent
when one tries to assess the scope of the Court's opinion. From an economic perspective, if
the key to eliminating the right to face-to-face confrontation is the individualized finding of
trauma, the Court's opinion fails to provide a defensible justification for why child abuse
victims should be treated differently than other witnesses who would suffer undue emotional
distress from face-to-face confrontation. The Court stated that the right to face-to-face confrontation may be dispensed with "where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Id. at 850. Inasmuch as the Court found that the Maryland procedure adequately
insures the reliability of the evidence, is there any reason to limit the procedure to child
abuse victims who would suffer trauma? In Maryland v. Craig, the Court ruled that as long
as there is an individual finding of trauma, the denial of the right to face-to-face confrontation was justified because: (1) a State has a legitimate and important interest in the physical
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims; (2) a State has a legitimate and important interest in protecting child abuse victims from the emotional trauma produced by testifying face-to-face in the presence of the defendant; and (3) the victim in the case in question
would have suffered more than de minimis trauma by having to testify face-to-face against
the defendant. See id. at 851-57. But does not a State have a legitimate and important interest in the physical and psychological well-being of the victims of all crimes? Does not a
State have a legitimate and important interest in protecting the victims of all crimes who
would suffer emotional distress from face-to-face confrontation from the emotional trauma? If
the victim of any crime, regardless of his or her age, can show that he or she would suffer
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interest, all the state has to prove is that the trauma to be experienced
by the witness as a result of face-to-face confrontation is "more than
de minimis, i.e., more than 'mere nervousness or excitement or some
reluctance to testify."' 285 The Court's opinion arguably ends up subjecting the right to face-to-face confrontation to a case by case costbenefit analysis regardless of the nature of the crime, the age of the
victim, or how the state interest is raised. The result is an opinion
which arguably permits the denial of face-to-face confrontation any'
time the witness is "psychologically unavailable."286
Such a result
would seriously undercut the long-standing right to face-to-face confrontation. The Court's opinion hints that the Court realized the po-

tentially far-reaching effect of the opinion, that the Court was uncomfortable with this potential effect, but the Court was unable to devel-

op a defensible limit to the scope of its opinion because of the
opinion's micro level perspective. 87
more than de minindis trauma by having to testify face-to-face against the defendant, should a
State deny the defendant the right to face-to-face confrontation? Although the Court's opinion
in Maryland v. Craig appears to attempt to limit the scope of its holding to child abuse
victims, there is nothing inherent in the Court's analysis or rationale which limits the scope
of its holding to child abuse victims. The Court's holding can easily be construed as a broad
attack on the right to face-to-face confrontation: any time a witness can show that he or she
would suffer more than de minimis trauma if required to testify face-to-face in the presence
of the defendant, the defendant may be denied the right to face-to-face confrontation, regardless of the age of the witness or the nature of the offense. Quantitatively, the costs of such
a broad rule intuitively would exceed the benefits. Qualitatively, there is not a need for such
a broad construction of the Court's opinion.
285. Id. at 856 (citing Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)).
286. See Myers, supra note 257, at 224-25 ("There is little doubt that the trauma of
testifying renders some individuals psychologically unavailable. In the context of child abuse
litigation . . . [t]he temptation to declare a child unavailable is very real, and a finding of
psychological unavailability is a relatively simple way to reach the desired goal.").
To claim that a child witness is psychologically unavailable might seem a natural
extension of the unavailability exception in the hearsay context. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
Given that each state with a Maryland-type procedure offers its own interpretation of what
constitutes trauma debilitating enough to make a witness psychologically unavailable, however,
indicates this standard is far too nebulous to be considered on the same constitutional ground
as the clearer hearsay exception of unavailability.
287. After going to great pains to establish that the Confrontation Clause reflects only a
"preference" for face-to-face confrontation which "must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case," the Court then attempted to limit the
exception it was creating to face-to-face confrontation:
That the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not absolute does not, of course,
mean that it may easily be dispensed with. As we suggested in Coy, our precedents confirm that a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be
satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of
such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.
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On the other hand, if the Court had viewed the problem present

in Maryland v. Craig from the macro level perspective, the Court's
holding would have been more defensible, the Court's opinion would
have provided greater guidance as to its scope and the opinion would
have preserved more of the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation." Viewed from the macro level perspective, the problem un-

derlying Maryland v. Craig is not the amount of trauma any individual victim or witness may suffer as a result of face-to-face con-

frontation, but rather whether face-to-face confrontation contributes to
the efficient and effective enforcement of criminal laws. Defendants in
child abuse cases may be denied their right to face-to-face confrontation only if such denial contributes to the efficient and effective enforcement of the child abuse laws, i.e., only if: (1) the aggregate
(micro level and macro level) costs of face-to-face confrontation for
child abuse cases exceed the benefits of face-to-face confrontation;

and (2) denying a defendant his or her right to face-to-face confrontation will in fact reduce the macro level reluctant complainant costs.
Assuming the state could show that the reason victims were not coming forward and participating in the prosecution process is because of

the costs involved in the right to face-to-face confrontation, the Supreme Court's holding would be more defensible. Basihg the Court's

holding on the macro view of the problem underlying Maryland v.
Craig also limits the scope of the opinion and preserves much of the

Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
288. Viewing the problem and the Court's holding in this perspective, the patent and latent questions left unanswered by the Court's opinion become easier to answer. First, the
Court expressly stated that it was not addressing the issue of how much trauma the victim
must suffer before the procedure can constitutionally be invoked. Id. at 856. The law and
economics analysis of the problem indicates that the procedure should not be invoked unless
the complainant is one who would not otherwise participate in the prosecution process. Second, the Court left open the issue of what other state interests would warrant depriving the
defendant of his or her right to face-to-face confrontation. Id. at 850. The law and economics
analysis indicates that this issue should not be addressed on the micro'level, despite the tone
and nature of the Supreme Court's opinion. The issue is not whether in any given case, the
costs to the complainant are so great that the defendant should be deprived of the right to
face-to-face confrontation. Rather, the issue needs to be addressed at the macro level: when
are the net social costs associated with the confrontation clause greater than the net social
costs associated with depriving the defendant of his or her right to face-to-face confrontation.
The only other crimes which may fit within this category would appear to be crimes of
sexual assault and possibly spousal abuse. But as the Supreme Court noted, the principal
reason the complainants fail to come forward must be from the trauma associated with having to confront the alleged perpetrator, not from the prosecution process generally. Id. at 856.
Absent evidence that this is the case, the holding in Maryland v. Craig should be narrowly
limited to the unique nature of the crime involved.
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defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation by preserving the basic
presumption that in any given case the benefits of face-to-face confrontation exceed the costs.
Although analyzing the problem at issue in Maryland v. Craig
from the macro level perspective does not necessarily limit the opinion in Maryland v. Craig to child abuse cases alone, it does require
that before a court engages in a case by case evaluation of the right
to face-to-face confrontation, the court has to show: (1) that the state
cannot achieve the desired level of deterrence for a particular crime;
(2) that the state cannot achieve the desired level of deterrence because in an extraordinarily high number of cases face-to-face confrontation would make obtaining the evidence either prohibitively
expensive or impossible (i.e., not enough victims are coming forward
and participating in the prosecution process); and (3) that the reason
obtaining the evidence is prohibitively expensive or impossible is
because of face-to-face confrontation. Then, and only then, should the
right to face-to-face prosecution be subject to evaluation on a case by
case basis.289
The macro level analysis of the issue in Maryland v. Craig also
answers the perplexing question of how much trauma must be endured by the witness before the right to face-to-face confrontation is
withheld from the defendant. Inasmuch as the underlying problem is
that not enough victims are coming forward to permit society to reach
the net punishment necessary to achieve the desired deterrence level,
the overriding concern must be to bring the reluctant complainants
into the prosecution process. The right to face-to-face confrontation
should be sacrificed in any given case only when the state can demonstrate that the victim would not or could not otherwise come forward and effectively participate in the prosecution process.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In the end, Maryland v. Craig should not be construed as a full
scale attack on the right to face-to-face confrontation (i.e., not a new
exception to the Confrontation Clause anytime a witness claims to be
psychologically unavailable), but rather only a very narrow intrusion
on the right to face-to-face confrontation necessary to achieve the

289. These elements may apply to the crimes of rape, spousal abuse, and similar crimes
where: (I) there is little direct evidence of the crime other than the complainant's testimony;
and (2) the nature of the crime increases the probability that a complainant would experience
trauma if required to testify face-to-face against the defendant.
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efficient and effective enforcement of the child abuse laws.
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